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INTRODUCTION
Child molestation is a grave and ubiquitous problem in our so-
ciety.1 It is also the type of crime that many people consider to be
the most detestable kind of behavior. 2 Due to the reprehensible
nature of the crime, juries often assume that an allegation of child
molestation is truthful.3 Perhaps acknowledging that these emo-
tions must not control the jury's decision-making process, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted Rule of Evidence 404(b).4
Rule 404(b), which creates a safeguard against juries' determining
1. In a 1989 survey, the Bureau of Justice Statistics polled 60,000 adults to
determine which crimes the public perceived as the most heinous. Although many
people considered murder the most heinous crime, rape, incest and child abuse
rank as the next three most disdained crimes. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Under-
taking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The
Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J.
285, 297 (1995); see also Laura Meade Kirk, Innocence Lost: Child Sexual Abuse in
Rhode Island, Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 29, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 14174516
(citing David Cicilline, a Rhode Island defense attorney who handles numerous
child-molestation cases).
2. See Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 297.
3. See Sarah B. Colley, New Mexico Rejects the "Lewd and Lascivious" Excep-
tion to Rule 404(b): State v. Lucero, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 427, 435 (1994) (noting that
the prejudicial effect of prior misconduct evidence can be quite powerful in child-
molestation cases); Mary Christine Hutton, Commentary, Prior Bad Acts Evidence
in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 604, 625-26 (1989) (noting
that prior misconduct evidence is outcome determinative in nearly all child-moles-
tation cases).
4. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b). The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence on July 23, 1987. These new evidentiary rules took effect
on October 1, 1987. Id. Before Rhode Island enacted evidentiary Rule 404(b), the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had followed a similar common-law rule. See State v.
Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 531-32 (R.I. 1978) (citing State v. Mastracchio, 312 A.2d 190
(R.I. 1973); State v. Guaraneri, 194 A. 589 (R.I. 1937)). Rhode Island Rule 404(b)
is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
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a defendant's legal fate based exclusively on emotion, prohibits the
use of character evidence to establish the accused's propensity to
commit the alleged crime. 5 Thus, the prosecution may not offer ev-
idence of a defendant's prior bad acts unless the evidence is sub-
stantially relevant for some other purpose besides proving the
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. 6
State v. Hopkins7 is the most recent example of the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court's trend of allowing trial judges greater discre-
tion in the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts within sexual-
molestation prosecutions.8 In Hopkins, the court admitted evi-
dence of prior bad acts of the defendant under the guise of permis-
sible prior bad-acts evidence. 9 Since child-molestation cases do not
fit neatly within the recognized other-purposes provision of Rule
404(b), the Rhode Island Supreme Court tends to condone a manip-
ulation of the rule so that virtually all prior sexual-misconduct evi-
dence is admissible.' 0 Thus, the court continues to ignore the fact
that the prejudicial effect of prior bad-acts evidence can be espe-
cially strong in child-molestation cases." The supreme court's
practice of condoning the manipulation of Rule 404(b) to permit the
admission of prior bad-acts evidence essentially eviscerates the
protections enunciated by the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, and
thus renders the determination of the admissibility of prior bad-
acts evidence enigmatic.
5. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
6. See Jalette, 382 A.2d at 532; see also State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316
(R.I. 1997) (noting that prior bad-acts evidence is generally inadmissible and
courts cannot admit the evidence solely to prove the defendant's propensity to com-
mit the charged crime); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 720 (R.I. 1985) (recognizing
that prior bad-acts evidence is admissible to establish a fact, other than propen-
sity, that tends to prove the defendant's guilt).
7. 698 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1997).
8. See id. See generally Douglas J. Brocker, Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law: Indelible Ink in the Milk: Adoption of the Inclusionary Approach to
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in State v. Coffey, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1604, 1604
(1991) ("The issue of admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is the most liti-
gated evidentiary issue in most federal and state appellate courts. The multitude
of litigation in this area no doubt results from the highly prejudicial effect this type
of evidence has on judges, juries, and lay-persons.").
9. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 183.
10. See Hutton, supra note 3, at 616-17 (noting that since prior sexual-miscon-
duct evidence does not fit within the traditional Rule 404(b) exceptions, often "im-
precise or specious reasoning is offered in support" of trial judges pigeonholing the
evidence under the plan, identity or intent exceptions).
11. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185-87.
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The American system of criminal justice presumes that (1) all
people are innocent until proven guilty12 and (2) courts can only
convict a defendant if the evidence presented establishes the ac-
cused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.13 In order to promote
these bedrock principles, Federal Rule 404(b), and in turn Rhode
Island Rule 404(b), prohibit prosecutors from proffering prior bad-
acts evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the
alleged crime. 14 The rationale behind this prohibition is to protect
12. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the admin-
istration of our criminal law."); United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) ("'[Cloncomitant of the presumption of innocence,'" is that "[ilt is funda-
mental to American jurisprudence that 'a defendant must be tried for what he did,
not for who he is.'"); see also Amber Donner-Froelich, Other Crimes Evidence to
Prove the Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Offense, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 217, 218
(1985) (noting that a basic tenet of the American criminal-justice system is that
courts must presume that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty).
13. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Un-
charged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 130
n.6 (1993) (quoting remarks of Senator Verplanck, quoted in People v. White, 24
Wend. 561, 574 (N.Y. 1840)).
The rule and practice of our law in relation to evidence of character rests
on the deepest principles of truth and justice. The protection of the law is
due alike to the righteous and unrighteous. The sun of justice shines
alike "for the evil and the good, the just and the unjust." Crime must be
proved, not presumed; on the contrary, the most vicious is presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty. The admission of a contrary rule, even in any
degree, would open a door not only to direct oppression of those who are
vicious because they are ignorant and weak, but even to the operation of
prejudices as to religion, politics, character, profession, [sic] manners,
upon the minds of honest and well-intentioned jurors.
Id.; see also Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 560 (1918) (noting that the court
must consider the defendant innocent until the prosecution proves his or her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt); Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify
the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 515, 515 (1995) (noting
that "it is a basic tenet of American jurisprudence that in order to convict, the jury
must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt").
14. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (holding that
"[the overriding policy of excluding such evidence... is the practical experience
that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and un-
due prejudice"); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (finding that ex-
trinsic evidence of prior robberies is inadmissible to prove murder); United States
v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1282, 1282 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (holding that due to the likeli-
hood of unfair prejudice, prior bad-acts evidence is inadmissible); State v. Colvin,
425 A.2d 508, 511 (R.I. 1981) (holding that prosecutors cannot introduce un-
charged prior bad-acts evidence to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the
alleged crime); Amy E. Collier, Note, State of Louisiana v. Jackson: Evidence of
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the defendant from the unfair prejudicial effect of evidence offered
solely to establish the defendant's bad character instead of his ac-
tual guilt. 15 Such evidence may tend to allow a jury to convict a
defendant on less than probative and relevant evidence. Thirty-six
states recognize some form of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)i6-a
rule that prohibits the use of character evidence to establish the
Allegations of Prior Sexual Abuse by Accused in an Intra-Family Context, 55 La. L.
Rev. 1191, 1192 (1995) (noting that "[tlraditionally, English and American courts
refused to admit evidence of a defendant's bad moral character in a criminal prose-
cution when offered to prove conduct on a particular occasion"). But see Hodge v.
United States, 126 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (allowing the admission of "other-
crimes" evidence in prosecutions for sexual offenses to show similar mental
dispositions).
15. See, e.g., People v. Stout, 4 Park. Crim. 71, 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858)
("Trained judicial minds may be able to eliminate from a mass of irrelevant and
general criminative facts, those which directly bear upon the crime charged
against the prisoner, but the very character of juries, and the theory of trial by
jury, require that all prejudicial evidence tending to raise in their minds an antipa-
thy to the prisoner, and which does not directly tend to prove the simple issue,
should be carefully excluded from them."); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, A
Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the
Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 Syracuse L. Rev.
1125, 1137 (1993) (noting that the admission of prior bad-acts evidence might lure
the jury into convicting the defendant even though the prosecution has not proven
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
16. See Reed, supra note 13, at 158-59. As of May 1, 1998, the following
thirty-six states and two provinces had adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence:
Alaska R. Evid. 101 to 1101; Ariz. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Ark. R. Evid. 101 to 1102;
Colo. R. Evid. 101 to 1103 (West 1984); Del. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 90.101 to .958 (West 1979); Guam Civ. Code §§ 101 to 1102 (1988); Haw. R.
Evid. 101 to 1102 (West 1989); Idaho R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Iowa R. Evid. 101 to
1103; Ky. R. Evid. 101 to 1104; La. Code. Evid. Ann. Arts. 101 to 1102 (West 1989);
Me. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Mich. R. Evid. 101 to 1102; Minn. R. Evid. 101 to 1101;
Miss. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Mont. R. Evid. 100 to 1008; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-101 to
-1103 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 47.020 to 52.500 (1988); N.H. R. Evid. 100 to 1103;
N.J. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; N.M. R. Evid. 11-101 to -1102; N.C. R. Evid. 8-1 to -103;
N.D. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Ohio R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12,
§§ 2101 to 3103 (West 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 40.010 to 40.585 (1988); P.R. Laws
Ann. Tit. 32, app. IV, rules 1 to 84 (1988); R.I. R. Evid. 100 to 1008; S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. §§ 19-9-1 to -18-9 (1995); Tenn. R. Evid. 100 to 1008; Tex. R. Civ. Evid.
101 to 1008; Utah R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Vt. R. Evid. 101 to 1103; Wash. R. Evid.
101 to 1103; W. Va. R. Evid. 101 to 1102; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 901.01 to 911.02 (West
1997); Wyo. R. Evid. 101 to 1104. California has a similar code which also allows
uncharged prior bad-acts evidence. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 (West 1995). The re-
maining fourteen states follow a common-law version of the Uniform Rules 404
and 405 which also allow the prosecution to present prior uncharged bad-acts
evidence.
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defendant's propensity to commit the alleged crime-as a tool to
prevent jurors from ignoring these principles. 17
Federal Rule 404(b) provides a number of well-established ex-
ceptions to its prohibition against the use of propensity evidence.' 8
Specifically, courts may admit prior bad-acts evidence when the
prosecution offers the evidence solely for the other purpose of prov-
ing a fact that tends to establish that the accused committed the
crime charged.' 9 The advisory committee notes for both the Fed-
eral and the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence recommend that
courts should construe the other purposes articulated within Rule
404(b) narrowly because the admission of uncharged bad-acts evi-
dence will severely deter a defendant's chance of facing an impar-
tial jury.20 Despite the warnings bestowed within the advisory
committee notes, courts throughout the country, in response to so-
ciety's increasing outrage towards sexual predators,21 continue to
17. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1997) (rec-
ognizing that trial judges cannot admit prior misconduct evidence to establish the
accused's "criminal disposition"); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2nd
Cir. 1997) (noting that courts cannot admit prior bad-acts evidence to prove the
defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime); United States v. Peden, 961
F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that prior bad-acts evidence is not admissi-
ble to prove that a defendant is acting in conformity with his bad character);
United States v. Gometz, 879 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that trial
judges cannot admit prior bad-acts evidence merely to establish the defendant's
propensity to commit the charged crime). See generally Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory
committee's note. However, the prosecution may introduce character evidence
when it is relevant for another purpose besides propensity. See, e.g., R.I. R. Evid.
404(b).
18. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also R.I. R. Evid. 404(b) (acknowledging that
courts may admit prior bad-acts evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake).
19. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
20. See Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee's note; see also Miguel A. Men-
dez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's
About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged
Misconduct, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 473, 474-75 (1995) (noting that in the 1960s, the
Chicago Jury Project study concluded that juries tend only to presume that a de-
fendant is innocent if the defendant does not have a prior criminal record) (citing
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 160-61, 178-79 (Univ. of Chi-
cago Press 1971) (1966)); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing
and Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 777 (1961) ("The jurors almost universally
used defendant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was more
likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing trial.").
21. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, Note, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The
New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evi-
dence in Washington, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 883, 901 (1995) (noting that due to "wide-
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expand their respective interpretations of the other-purposes ex-
ceptions within evidentiary Rule 404(b). Specifically, by admitting
virtually all prior sexual-misconduct evidence, many courts con-
tinue to expand Rule 404(b) to the point that the evidentiary excep-
tions nullify the rule.22
Rhode Island courts also continue to nullify evidentiary Rule
404(b). In State v. Hopkins, the Rhode Island Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's admittance of prior bad-acts evidence under
Rule 404(b)'s other-purposes exception.23 In Hopkins, the com-
plaining witness alleged that his stepfather sexually abused him
repeatedly over a period of approximately four years.24 Along with
the testimony of the complaining witness, the trial judge permitted
the prosecution to introduce evidence concerning prior uncharged
bad-acts, e.g., allegations of previous sexual abuse committed by
the defendant. 25 The court permitted the jury to hear testimony
from two men, each of whom alleged that the defendant molested
him when he was a child.26 The trial judge admitted the prior un-
charged bad-acts testimony despite the fact that these acts oc-
curred approximately ten years earlier 27 and were not connected to
the present criminal charges. 28 The trial judge admitted the prior
uncharged bad-acts evidence first under the common-law lewd-dis-
position exception and second under the 404(b) other purpose of
spread contempt" the public has a "crusade" against accused sexual offenders);
Jeannie Mayre Mar, Washington's Expansion of the "Plan" Exception After State v.
Lough, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 845, 864 (1996); see also David P. Bryden & Roger C.
Park, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases: Reassessing the Rule of
Exclusion, 141 Mil. L. Rev. 171, 171-72 (1993) (noting that the public became more
interested in the use of prior bad-acts evidence in sex-offense cases after the tele-
vised rape trial of William Kennedy Smith in 1991).
22. See Colley, supra note 3, at 434 n.60; Mar, supra note 21, at 864 ("Com-
mentators have noted a growing number of state laws granting more liberal admis-
sion of prior acts evidence in cases involving sex crimes.") (citing David J.
Kaloyanides, Comment, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the
Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 25 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1297, 1307 (1992)).
23. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185.
24. Id. at 184.
25. See id. at 183.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 186 (noting that the abuse claimed by the two prosecution wit-
nesses allegedly occurred approximately ten years before the abuse alleged by the
complaining witness).
28. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 190 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
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plan.29 More specifically, the court admitted the prior bad-acts tes-
timony under the lewd-disposition and plan exceptions because the
evidence demonstrated the defendant's tendency to molest young
boys under his control.30 Hopkins appealed his conviction. He con-
tended that the trial judge committed a reversible error by improp-
erly admitting this prior bad-acts evidence since the evidence
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.31 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to admit the
prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition and plan excep-
tions,32 thus eviscerating the protections conferred by evidentiary
Rule 404(b).
This Note analyzes the Rhode Island Supreme Court's affirma-
tion of the Hopkins trial judge's decision to admit evidence of the
defendant's uncharged prior bad acts under the lewd-disposition
and plan exceptions. Moreover, this Note argues that the court im-
properly expanded the lewd-disposition and plan exceptions to the
point that virtually all character evidence is admissible within sex-
ual-molestation prosecutions. Part I briefly discusses Rhode Is-
land Rule of Evidence 404(b). Part II first discusses the lewd-
disposition exception in general and then examines its application
in Rhode Island. Secondly, Part II discusses the application of the
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) plan exception. Part III dis-
cusses the procedural and factual history of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court case of State v. Hopkins. Part IV proffers two argu-
ments. First, the Hopkins court inappropriately expanded the
lewd-disposition exception to allow dissimilar prior bad-acts testi-
mony from third parties. Second, the Hopkins court misapplied
the plan exception, thereby admitting highly prejudicial propensity
evidence. Part V, in conclusion, reiterates that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court misapplied the lewd-disposition exception and the
plan exception, and thus fell victim to the theory that cases involv-
ing sexual misconduct merit special treatment under the law.
29. See id. at 184-85.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 183.
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I. HISTORY OF RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)
A. Rationale for 404(b) Prohibition
In an attempt to limit the likelihood of courts unjustly convict-
ing defendants, thirty-six states,33 as well as the United States
Congress, have adopted some form of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b).3 4 Specifically, evidentiary Rule 404(b) prohibits the intro-
duction of prior misconduct evidence when the sole purpose of the
evidence is to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the alleged
crime. 35 The intent of Rule 404(b) is to prevent juries from leaping
to assumptions of guilt based on the inference that the defendant
is acting in conformity with that alleged bad character on a partic-
ular day.36 Rather, the rule dictates that jurors must base their
findings of guilt solely on the evidence presented pertaining to the
charged crime.
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) similarly prohibits un-
charged prior bad-acts evidence for the purpose of proving the de-
fendant's bad character. 37 Rhode Island Rule 404(b) provides:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith.38
33. See supra note 16.
34. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975. But see Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414 (adopted by Congress in 1994).
35. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d
207, 212 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that prior bad-acts evidence is not admissible to
prove propensity); Donner-Froelich, supra note 12, at 219.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that prior bad-acts evidence often is highly inflammatory and prejudicial);
United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that jurors
are likely to convict a defendant even if the prosecution does not prove its case
since they believe that the defendant is an abhorrent person who belongs in jail).
37. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b); see, e.g., State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.
1995) (noting that generally, prior uncharged bad-acts evidence is irrelevant and
inadmissible); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 720 (R.I. 1985) (recognizing that prior
bad-acts evidence is not admissible to prove propensity); State v. Sepe, 410 A.2d
127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (noting that because evidence of prior bad-acts is so prejudi-
cial, it is per se inadmissible to show propensity); State v. Peters, 136 A.2d 620,
621 (R.I. 1957) (acknowledging that the prosecution cannot use evidence of the
defendant's prior bad-acts to prove the present alleged crime); State v. Wright, 36
A.2d 657, 660 (R.I. 1944) (recognizing that prior bad-acts evidence is generally not
admissible to prove defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime).
38. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
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Three public-policy principles underpin the adoption of Rhode
Island Rule of Evidence 404(b). First, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, like Congress, adopted this rule to prevent jurors from un-
justly convicting a defendant based on their presumptive belief
that the accused is a bad person.39 Specifically, jurors may
wrongly conclude that it is their duty to remove the defendant from
society, since he is a bad person, regardless of whether he is actu-
ally guilty of the crime charged. 40 Second, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted Rule 404(b) to prevent jurors from convict-
ing a defendant based on their belief that the prior bad acts indi-
cate an ongoing propensity in the accused to commit the charged
crime.4 ' This rationale attempts to prevent jurors from placing
undue weight on a defendant's prior uncharged misconduct.42 Fi-
nally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted Rule 404(b) be-
cause a court's decision to admit prior uncharged misconduct
39. See id. advisory committee's note; see also Gallagher, 654 A.2d at 1210-11
(recognizing that jurors may presume a defendant is guilty based on the admission
of prior bad-acts testimony); State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 912 (R.I. 1995) (ac-
knowledging that the admission of prior sexual-misconduct evidence will likely
make the jury hostile); State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I. 1993) (noting that
usually prior bad-acts evidence is inadmissible since its prejudicial value out-
weighs its probative value); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I. 1993) (rec-
ognizing that jurors tend to presume prior sexual-misconduct evidence is
indicative of whether the defendant committed the charged sexual offense); State
v. Powell, 533 A.2d 530, 531 (R.I. 1987) (recognizing that prior bad-acts evidence
"creates 'a real possibility that the generality of the jury's verdict will mask a find-
ing of guilt that is based upon involvement with unrelated crimes rather than evi-
dence offered to prove defendant's guilt of the crime charged'"); State v. Jalette,
382 A.2d 526, 532 (R.I. 1978) (noting that the admission of prior bad-acts evidence
is likely to lead to unfair convictions since juries will base their determination of
guilt on the defendant's prior bad behavior); Collier, supra note 14, at 1192 (recog-
nizing that prior bad-acts evidence likely will lead to a defendant's conviction since
the jury tends to believe that the defendant is a bad person); Donner-Froelich,
supra note 12, at 220 (noting that juries tend to overestimate the probative value
of prior bad-acts evidence and therefore, find the defendant guilty since he is sup-
posedly a bad person).
40. See Mar, supra note 21, at 847.
41. See, e.g., Gallagher, 654 A.2d at 1210 (recognizing that there is a danger
that the jury may assume that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime because
he committed similar crimes in the past); Collier, supra note 14, at 1192 (noting
that jurors may convict a defendant on the charged crime because he avoided pun-
ishment for his prior crimes); Donner-Froelich, supra note 12, at 220 (noting that
prior bad-acts evidence "draws the jury's attention to the type of person the de-
fendant is, thus tempting the jury to convict the defendant because he is a bad
man, rather than because they believe the defendant is guilty of the charged
crime").
42. See Mar, supra note 21, at 847.
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evidence may impose an unreasonable burden on the defendant.43
Such a ruling would unfairly force the accused not only to defend
against the charged crime but also against an alleged act which
purportedly transpired a number of years earlier"44 This Note ar-
gues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Hopkins
ignores all three of Rule 404(b)'s purported purposes.
B. "Other-Purposes" Exceptions
Although Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the
introduction of character evidence to prove the defendant's propen-
sity to commit bad acts,45 such prior bad-acts evidence is admissi-
ble under exceptional circumstances, e.g., when proffered for some
"other purpose."46 Accordingly, Rule 404(b) additionally provides:
[Prior bad-acts evidence] may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
43. See, e.g., Haslam, 663 A.2d at 912 (recognizing that prior bad-acts evi-
dence is, by its very nature, likely to incite the jury's animosity); see also Collier,
supra note 14, at 1192 (acknowledging that the admission of prior bad-acts evi-
dence places a burden on the defendant).
44. See id.
45. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I. 1993)
(recognizing that prior bad-acts evidence is inadmissible because "the potential for
creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors outweighs its probative value"); State
v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1193 (R.I. 1988) (noting that prosecutors generally
cannot use evidence of prior uncharged bad acts to prove the defendant's propen-
sity to commit the alleged crime).
46. See R.I. R. Evid. 404(b); see also, e.g., Haslam, 663 A.2d at 912 (noting that
prior bad-acts evidence is admissible to prove something other than propensity);
State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 923 (R.I. 1995) (recognizing that courts can admit
prior bad-acts evidence "to show a fact or facts which tend to prove that the defend-
ant is guilty of the crime charged"); State v. Waite, 665 A.2d 1338, 1339 (R.I. 1995)
(noting that prior bad-acts evidence is admissible to show the defendant's motive,
intent or plan); State v. Powell, 533 A.2d 530, 531 (R.I. 1987) (acknowledging that
prior misconduct evidence may be admissible to prove the accused's "knowledge,
intent, motive, design, plan or scheme"); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.
1985) (recognizing that other-crimes evidence may be admissible to prove a fact
that tends to establish the defendant's guilt); State v. Colvin, 425 A.2d 508, 511
(R.I. 1981) (acknowledging that prior bad-acts evidence is admissible to prove plan,
knowledge, intent or motive); State v. DeWolf, 402 A.2d 740, 744 (R.I. 1979) (not-
ing that prior misconduct evidence may be admissible to prove motive, plan or
intent); State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 532 (R.I. 1978) (noting that prior miscon-
duct evidence may only be admissible if it is offered to prove something other than
propensity); State v. Colangelo, 179 A. 147, 149 (R.I. 1935) (recognizing that other-
crimes evidence may be admissible to establish the defendant's intent, motive or
plan).
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accident, or to prove that the defendant feared imminent bod-
ily harm and that the fear was reasonable. 47
Rule 404(b)'s general rule of exclusion does not apply when the
prosecution offers the prior bad-acts evidence to prove something
other than character. 48 Provided the prosecution can compartmen-
talize the propensity evidence into one of these other-purpose ex-
ceptions, and the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighs its tendency to cause undue prejudice, confusion or
waste of time, the evidence is admissible. 49 However, even when
prior bad-acts evidence fits within a Rule 404(b) exception, the
trial judge ought to exercise great caution when deciding whether
to admit the evidence because prior misconduct evidence is inad-
missible when it creates prejudice that may overwhelm the evi-
dence's probative value.50 Trial judges must couple all admissible
prior bad-acts evidence with limiting instructions. 51 These limit-
47. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
48. Id. This list of exceptions is not intended to be an exhaustive list. See
Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1192; State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1004 (R.I. 1985);
Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
49. See R.I. R. Evid. 403 ("[Allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); see also State v.
Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 185 (R.I. 1983) (Kelleher, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
courts need to balance the danger of undue prejudice against the probative value of
the prior bad-acts evidence when deciding whether to admit the evidence); (noting
that "Professor Moore, in discussing the provisions of Fed. R. of Evidence 404(b)
which relates to the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, emphasizes
that before such evidence is admitted, the danger of undue prejudice to the defend-
ant must be balanced against the probative value of the proffered evidence") (citing
10 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 404.21[21 at IV-114 (1982)).
50. See R.I. R. Evid. 402 (noting that trial judges need to balance the proba-
tive value of the evidence against the prejudicial value of the evidence before decid-
ing whether to admit the offered evidence); see also Mar, supra note 21, at 864-65
(recognizing that prosecutors armed with evidentiary Rule 404(b) and the knowl-
edge of the increasing number of state laws granting more expansive admission of
prior bad-acts evidence in sex-crimes cases use sexual-offense evidence not to pre-
dict behavior, but to provide an inflammatory suggestion to the jury).
51. See, e.g., State v. Ackerman, 655 A.2d 688, 689 (R.I. 1995) (noting that
when 404(b) evidence is admissible, the trial judge must provide a limiting instruc-
tion); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I. 1995) (holding that a limiting
instruction must accompany the admission of prior uncharged bad-acts evidence);
Haslam, 663 A.2d at 912 (recognizing that the trial judge's limiting instructions
are a safeguard preventing the jury from using the prior bad-acts evidence improp-
erly); State v. Lamphere, 658 A-2d 900, 904 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the court's
failure to give limiting instructions regarding the admission of uncharged acts of
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ing instructions facilitate the deliberation process and prevent the
misapplication of evidence by alerting the jury to the exact 404(b)
exception that the prosecution is offering the prior bad-acts evi-
dence to prove.6 2
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE TO PROVE
SOMETHING OTHER THAN CHARACTER
As a general principle, Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b)
prohibits the use of character evidence to prove that a defendant
acted in accordance with his alleged bad character on a particular
occasion.53 Therefore, if the only purpose for a witness's testimony
is to demonstrate the defendant's bad character, then the evidence
is inadmissible.5 4 However, if the prosecution offers character evi-
sexual misconduct, offered to show lewd disposition, created a reversible error);
State v. McVeigh, 660 A.2d 269, 272 (R.I. 1995) (noting that the jury charge must
specifically designate the limited purpose for admitting prior bad-acts evidence);
State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I. 1993) (recognizing the need for limiting
instructions when prior uncharged bad-acts evidence is admissible); State v.
Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I. 1993) (noting that the trial judge must inform the
jury to the specific purpose the prosecution is offering the prior bad-acts evidence).
52. See supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., State v. Moulton, No. 97-103-C.A., 1997 WL 775888, at *1 (R.I.
Oct. 23, 1997) (acknowledging that trial judges cannot usually admit prior bad-
acts evidence to establish whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime);
State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316 (R.I. 1997) (recognizing that prior misconduct
evidence is normally considered "so prejudicial that it is per se inadmissible"); Has-
lam, 663 A.2d at 911 (noting that normally evidence of prior crimes committed by
the defendant is inadmissible); Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1193 (noting that usually
prior bad-acts evidence is inadmissible to establish the defendant's propensity to
commit the charged crime); State v. Powell, 533 A.2d 530, 531 (R.I. 1987) (noting
that evidence of a previously committed crimes is "irrelevant and inadmissible");
State v. Colvin, 425 A.2d 508, 511 (R.I. 1981) (evidence of prior bad acts is inadmis-
sible because it tends to unduly prejudice the defendant); State v. Sepe, 410 A.2d
127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (recognizing that trial judges should admit prior misconduct
evidence sparingly because such evidence may unfairly prejudice the defendant).
54. In Jalette, the court stated that "another reason for this exclusionary prin-
ciple is the prejudicial potential of such evidence, the real possibility that the gen-
erality of the jury's verdict may mask a finding of guilt which is based upon
involvement with unrelated crimes rather than on the evidence which shows the
defendant guilty of the crime charged." Jalette, 382 A.2d at 532 (citing Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967)); see, e.g., Lamphere, 658 A.2d at 904 (noting that
prior bad-acts evidence cannot be admitted to prove the defendant's propensity to
commit bad acts); Gallagher, 654 A.2d at 1206 (recognizing that trial judges can-
not admit prior misconduct evidence when it is only being offered to prove the
defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime); Colvin, 425 A.2d at 511 (not-
ing that evidence of prior misconduct is normally not admissible); State v. Beau-
lieu, 359 A.2d 689, 692 (R.I. 1979) (recognizing that prior bad-acts evidence is
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dence to prove something other than the defendant's propensity to
commit a particular act, then the evidence is admissible.55 The
reasoning behind the other-purposes exceptions is the notion that
in certain instances the validity of the prosecution's reasons for of-
fering the evidence outweighs the possibility of prejudice.56 Rhode
Island recognizes this reasoning as sound.
A. The Admissibility of Character Evidence to Prove Lewd
Disposition
In addition to the other-purposes exceptions explicitly articu-
lated within Rule 404(b), twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia recognize an exception designed specifically for prosecut-
ing sex crimes. 57 This exception, termed the lewd-disposition ex-
generally not admissible); State v. Aurgemma, 358 A.2d 46, 50 (R.I. 1976) (noting
that "evidence of other and distinct criminal acts is generally prejudicial and inad-
missible"); State v. Mastracchio, 312 A.2d 190, 194 (R.I. 1973) (recognizing that
evidence of prior bad-acts is not admissible to establish the defendant's guilt);
State v. Mazzarella, 236 A.2d 446, 449 (R.I. 1967) (noting that generally prior
criminal-misconduct evidence is inadmissible to prove the defendant's guilt); State
v. Colangelo, 179 A. 147, 149 (R.I. 1935) (noting that usually prior bad-acts evi-
dence is inadmissible because it will unfairly prejudice the defendant).
55. See, e.g., Beaulieu, 359 A.2d at 692 (recognizing that prior bad-acts evi-
dence may be admissible if the evidence "tends to establish guilty knowledge, in-
tent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system, or the like"); Mazzarella, 236 A.2d at
449 (acknowledging that prior bad-acts evidence may be admitted to establish the
defendant's criminal intent); Colangelo, 179 A. at 149 (noting that prior bad-acts
evidence may be admissible if the bad acts are "interwoven with the offense for
which the defendant is being tried"); State v. Horton, 133 A. 236, 239 (R.I. 1926)
(noting that evidence of other prior bad acts may be admissible to prove the ac-
cused's intent to commit the charged crime).
56. See Jalette, 382 A.2d at 532.
57. See Reed, supra note 13, at 159 n.180 (noting that the following states
admit prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition exception: Alaska: So-
per v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 590 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Arizona: State v. Beck, 726
P.2d 227, 231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Arkansas: Free v. State, 732 S.W.2d 452, 455
(Ark. 1987); California: People v. Stewart, 226 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); District of Columbia: Pounds v. United States, 529 A.2d 791, 794 (D.C.
1987); Georgia: Rogers v. State, 401 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. 1991); Idaho: State v.
Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830, 834 (Idaho 1984); Iowa: State v. Plaster, 424
N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988); Kansas: State v. Damewood, 783 P.2d 1249, 1256
(Kan. 1989); Kentucky: Thacker v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. Ct. App.
1991); Louisiana: State v. Howard, 520 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. King, 441 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Mass. 1982); Mis-
sissippi: Coates v. State, 495 So. 2d 464, 468 (Miss. 1986); Missouri: State v. Gra-
ham, 641 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Mo. 1986); Nebraska: State v. Craig, 361 N.W.2d 206,
213 (Neb. 1985); Nevada: McMichael v. State, 577 P.2d 398, 400 (Nev. 1978); New
Mexico: State v. Mankiller, 722 P.2d 1183, 1191 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Penn-
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ception,5 s allows the prosecution to present evidence of an accused
sex offender's prior sexual misconduct in its case-in-chief as a
means to establish the defendant's inclination to commit sex
crimes.59 Proponents of the lewd-disposition exception assert two
public-policy reasons for adopting this special character-evidence
exception: (1) to curtail the high rate of recidivism in child-moles-
sylvania: Commonwealth v. McLucas, 516 A.2d 68, 71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);
Rhode Island: State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531 (R.I. 1992); South Dakota: State
v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 841-44 (S.D. 1988); Texas: Boutwell v. State, 719
S.W.2d 164, 174-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Utah: State v. Neel, 65 P. 494, 495
(Utah 1908); Vermont: State v. Cardinal, 584 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Vt. 1981); Virginia:
Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 1981); Washington: State v.
Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1229 (Wash. 1991); West Virginia: In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d
365, 382 (W. Va. 1991); Wisconsin: State v. Friederich, 398 N.W.2d 763, 771-74
(Wis. 1987); Wyoming: Maniken v. State, 737 P.2d 345,346-47 (Wyo. 1987)). How-
ever, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, New York and Oregon have eliminated their
versions of the lewd-disposition exception within the last ten years. See id. at 218
(citing Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988); Lannon v. State, 600 N.E.2d
1334, 1338-39 (Ind. 1992); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky.
1985); People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 916-17 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Zybach, 761
P.2d 1334 (Or. App. 1988)).
58. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 529, 557 (1997) (noting that the lewd-disposition exception
is also referred to as "lustful disposition," "lascivious disposition" or "depraved sex-
ual instinct"),
59. See Reed, supra, note 13, at 218; see also United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d
1438, 1441 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that prior sexual-misconduct evidence may
be admissible to show the defendant's need to gratify his sexual craving); Staggers
v. State, 172 S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ga. 1969) (stating that uncharged bad-acts evidence
may be admissible to show defendant's intent to use his children to satisfy his
sexual desires). But see State v. Lucero, 840 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that in essence, the lewd-disposition exception is nothing more than
an euphemism for admitting the propensity evidence which evidentiary Rule
404(b) is intended to keep out); see also Mary Katherine Danna, Note, The New
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Prejudice of Politics or Just Plain Com-
mon Sense?, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 277, 283 (1996) (recognizing that "the [lewd-]dis-
position exception is a true disregarding of the character evidence ban where sex
offenses are charged because the courts, in employing the exception, make no pre-
tense about the purpose for which jurors can use the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence: the evidence goes directly to the issue of the defendant's character").
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tation cases6° and (2) to enhance the credibility of the testimony of
a child victim-witness. 61
First, proponents of the lewd-disposition exception assert that
sexual-molestation prosecutions warrant a special exception be-
cause of the high recidivism rate among child molesters.62 Advo-
cates further argue that a degeneracy among sex offenders causes
the high recidivism rate.6 3 Therefore, this particular type of char-
acter evidence regarding possible prior sex offenses is relevant be-
60. In 1989, the Bureau of Justice released a statistics report on the recidi-
vism rate of convicted criminals. The study followed 100,00 prisoners for three
years after release. The results concluded that the recidivism rate for sex offend-
ers is lower than that for most crimes.
* Burglars: 31.9% re-arrested
* Drug offenders: 24.8% re-arrested
* Violent robbers: 19.6% re-arrested
* Rapists: 7.7% re-arrested
Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in
1983, 1 (1989). But see Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of
Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 5 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 501, 536 (1996) (recog-
nizing that since sex crimes often go unreported and few perpetrators ever get
caught, the number of repeat sexual offenders is probably much higher than the
surveys suggest); A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists
and Child Molesters, 28 Crime & Delinq. 450 (1982) (noting that proponents of the
lewd-disposition exception argue that statistics which show that the recidivism
rate of sex offenders is lower than that of other crimes misrepresent reality).
61. See, e.g., Lannon v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (recognizing
that courts originally adopted the lewd-disposition exception in order to "lend
credence to a victim's accusations or testimony which describe acts which would
otherwise 'seem improbable standing alone'").
62. See supra note 60. But see Lannon, 600 N.E.2d at 1336-37 (holding that,
despite the high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders, the rate is also high for
drug offenders, and therefore, sex offenders are not unique enough to warrant a
special exception); Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 298 (noting that there is nothing
particularly special about sex crimes which would warrant singling them out for a
unique rule which would allow courts to admit uncharged prior bad-acts evidence
more leniently than in drug transactions or possession of stolen property prosecu-
tions); Mar, supra note 21, at 864-65 (noting that "the fact remains that the
probability of predicting the recurrence of rape is no better than [the probability ofl
predicting the reoccurrence of murder"); see also Reed, supra note 13, at 155 (rec-
ognizing that the "reported recidivism rates for exhibitionists, pedophiles and ado-
lescent child abusers is about thirty percent").
63. See State v. Jackson, 81 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ohio App. 1948). See generally
Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 1226, 1234-35 (Ala. 1988) (noting that the defendant's
continual assaults against the complaining witness resulted from the defendant's
'sexual passion for the victim"); State v. Weatherbee, 762 P.2d 590, 591-92 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the defendant had a lewd disposition towards sexually
assaulting his daughters).
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cause it demonstrates that a defendant has a propensity for
aberrant sexual misconduct, thus making it more likely than not
that the accused committed the charged crime.64
Second, proponents of the lewd-disposition exception argue
that cases dealing with sexual molestation warrant a "greater lati-
tude of proof' as to prior bad acts66 in order to "level the playing
field by bolstering the testimony of a solitary child victim-wit-
ness."66 The proffered argument is that, since most sexual as-
saults occur in private with no witnesses and with little physical
evidence, a distinct exception is necessary in order to secure con-
victions in these cases where proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt would otherwise prove unduly difficult for the prosecution.
67
Furthermore, in sexual-molestation prosecutions, a credibility
question usually exists because a young victim is challenging the
trustworthiness of the adult defendant.68 Advocates argue that
the lewd-disposition exception is necessary in order to avoid swear-
ing contests between the complaining witness and defendant.6 9
While Rhode Island accepts both of these justifications as legiti-
mate reasons for adopting the lewd-disposition exception, this Note
demonstrates that the lewd-disposition exception is inapplicable in
Hopkins because the Rhode Island Supreme Court misapplied the
Rule 404(b) exception.
64. Segal, supra note 13, at 526-27.
65. State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763, 771 (Wis. 1987).
66. Lannon, 600 N.E.2d at 1335.
67. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and
Child Sex Abuse, 4 Crim L.F. 307, 317 (1993). But see id. (recognizing that "there
are other offenses, such as theft, that often occur in a clandestine fashion").
68. See People v. Covert, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. App. 1967); State v. Jack-
son, 81 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Hendrickson v. State, 212 N.W.2d
481, 483 (Wis. 1973). But see, e.g., Lannon, 600 N.E.2d at 1337-1338 (holding that
the need to bolster the testimony of the child witness does not present a rational
basis for creating a special exception to the rule against character evidence since
"accusations of child molestation no longer appear improbable"); Alexander v.
State, 753 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that evidence of prior miscon-
duct by the defendant against a six-year old girl is not admissible at the defend-
ant's trial for molesting a four-year old girl, despite the fact that the defendant's
wife cared for both children); State v. McCarthy, 589 A.2d 869 (Vt. 1991) (holding
that it was a reversible error to admit evidence regarding the defendant's alleged
sexual assault against one child when the defendant was being tried for molesting
another child).
69. See Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1989); see also Beale, supra note 67,
at 317 (noting that since sexual assaults often occur in private, cases often turn
into credibility contests between the complaining witness and the defendant).
19981 RHODE ISLAND RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b)
1. The Lewd-Disposition Exception in Rhode Island: The
Jalette Test
In the seminal case State v. Jalette,70 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of prior
bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition exception in sexual-
molestation prosecutions. 71 In Jalette, the trial judge permitted
the mother of the complaining witness to testify about the occur-
rence and details of a prior uncharged sexual assault by the de-
fendant, her husband, against the complaining witness. 72 The
supreme court affirmed this admission of the prior bad-acts evi-
dence, holding that the testimony demonstrated the defendant's
lewd disposition towards his daughter.73 Since the applicability of
the lewd-disposition exception in Jalette was a question of first im-
pression, the court carefully articulated when courts may admit
prior bad-acts evidence under this exception.74
First, the Jalette court restricted the admissibility of lewd-dis-
position evidence to "evidence of other not too remote sex crimes
with the particular person concerned in the crime on trial."75 The
court explained that "not too remote sex crimes" only include prior
crimes committed against the complaining witness.76 Therefore,
courts may only admit evidence of prior bad acts committed
against a third party to prove an exception specifically articulated
within Rule 404(b), and not under the lewd-disposition exception. 77
Second, recognizing that the admission of other-crimes evi-
dence poses a substantial risk to a defendant's right to a fair
70. 382 A.2d 526 (R.I. 1978).
71. See Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533 (holding that "in case[s of sexual assault, this
list of exceptions was also expanded to allow evidence of past conduct to show the
defendant's lewd disposition.., toward the prosecuting witness").
72. Id. at 531.
73. Id. at 533-34 (noting that the court vacated and remanded the defendant's
conviction since the trial judge committed a reversible error by admitting hearsay
evidence).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 533 (quoting People v. Kelly, 424 P.2d 947, 954-56 (Cal. 1967)).
76. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
77. See id. (holding that "evidence that the accused committed nonremote sim-
ilar sexual offenses with persons other than the victim may be admitted to prove
the presence of the traditional exceptions to the general rule, such as intent or
motive"); see also State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I. 1993) (noting that
"[iere weakness of the prosecution's case is insufficient reason to admit irrele-
vant and prejudicial evidence").
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trial,78 the supreme court further restricted the use of the lewd-
disposition exception. 79 This further restriction is threefold. First,
courts should admit evidence "sparingly" 0 and only when "reason-
ably necessary,"8 ' and should exclude the evidence when it is sim-
ply "cumulative."8 2 Second, courts may only admit the prior bad-
acts evidence when the evidence is relevant to establishing the
charges against the defendant.8 3 Third, courts must indicate with
particularity the exact exception to which the prior bad-acts evi-
dence is relevant, and the trial judge must instruct the jury regard-
ing the limited use of the evidence. 84
After Jalette, Rhode Island recognized the lewd-disposition ex-
ception. However, due to the court's apparent apprehension re-
garding the validity of the lewd-disposition exception, the court
provided these clear confines for trial judges to observe.8 5 More-
over, the court stressed that, since only evidence of uncharged bad-
acts committed against the complaining witness can demonstrate
the defendant's lustful and abhorrent disposition toward that spe-
78. See Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533 (noting that "evidence of other sexual behavior
is, by its very nature, uniquely apt to arouse the jury's hostility").
79. See id.
80. Id.; see also State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I. 1995) (holding
that courts should exercise great caution when deciding whether to admit prior
bad-acts evidence); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 71 (R.I. 1980) (noting that courts
should admit prior uncharged bad-acts evidence with caution and the evidence
should be admitted sparingly).
81. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533; see also State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 202 (R.I.
1983) (noting that courts should only admit prior bad-acts evidence that is reason-
ably necessary).
82. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533 (citing Commonwealth v. Boulden, 116 A.2d 867,
874 (Pa. Super. 1955) (acknowledging that, since "sex offenders are no more likely
to repeat than other offenders ... there is no more reason to admit prior offenses to
show depravity or propensity in a sex case than in any other case")); see also Car-
doza, 465 A.2d at 202 (acknowledging that trial judges should not admit prior bad-
acts evidence that is "merely cumulative").
83. See Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 532-533 (recognizing that prior bad-acts evidence can hinder the
defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial and therefore courts should admit such
evidence sparingly). The court also noted that the lewd-disposition exception is
questionable since it creates a specific exception for sex-offenders even though
their recidivism rate is no higher than the recidivism rate for other criminals. See
id. at 532 (citing Boulden, 116 A.2d at 874).
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cific person, evidence of bad acts committed against others is
irrelevant.8 6
2. Rhode Island's Continued Expansion of the Lewd-Disposition
Exception: The Pignolet Test
Until State v. Pignolet,s 7 the Rhode Island Supreme Court con-
sistently applied and adhered to the Jalette holding. In Pignolet,
the supreme court reaffirmed and expanded the Jalette lewd-dispo-
sition exception. Specifically, in addition to reaffirming the admis-
sion of prior uncharged bad-acts evidence committed against the
complaining witness, Pignolet expanded the exception to permit
third-party testimony regarding prior uncharged bad acts commit-
ted against other persons.88 In Pignolet, the trial court permitted
the prosecution to present testimony from the victim's older step-
sister regarding prior uncharged sexual misconduct of the defend-
ant, the complaining witness's father.89 The witness testified that
she was also a victim of their father's sexual advances on three
separate occasions.90 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
admission of the uncharged sexual-misconduct testimony. 91 The
court reasoned that the prior incidents "are relevant, material, and
highly probative" of the accused's lustful disposition toward young
girls over whom he exercised supervision and authority.92
After Pignolet, "not too remote sex crimes" may include sexual
acts committed against someone besides the complaining wit-
86. See id. at 532; see also, e.g., People v. Kelly, 424 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1967)
(noting that trial judges can only admit prior sexual-misconduct evidence with the
complaining witness under the lewd-disposition exception, since only this type of
evidence shows the defendant's lewd disposition toward the complaining witness);
People v. Greeley, 152 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ill. 1958) (acknowledging that prior sexual
misconduct against the complaining witness may be admissible); State v. Beck-
with, 180 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1962) (noting that trial judges may admit prior bad-
acts evidence pertaining to the complaining witness); Berger v. State, 20 A.2d 146,
148 (Md. 1941) (noting that prior sexual-misconduct evidence may be admissible
when the defendant allegedly committed the prior act against the complaining wit-
ness); State v. Di Giosia, 70 A.2d 756, 759-60 (N.J. 1950) (acknowledging that evi-
dence of prior bad acts against the complaining witness may be admissible to show
the defendant's "amorous inclination").
87. 465 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983).
88. See Segal, supra note 13, at 532.
89. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 179.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 182.
92, Id.
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ness. 93 In Pignolet, the Rhode Island Supreme Court expanded the
intent of the Jalette language "not too remote sex crimes" by rely-
ing on the analysis put forth in State v. Colangelo.94 Colangelo held
that the court may admit prior uncharged bad-acts evidence if the
evidence was "interwoven with the offense for which the defendant
[was] tried."95 The Pignolet court interpreted this "interwoven"
language to mean that evidence is interwoven, and thus admissible
under the lewd-disposition exception, if six conditions are met.
Specifically, the prosecution must demonstrate that the alleged
bad acts committed against the complaining witness and the al-
leged bad acts committed against the third party occurred: (1) dur-
ing the same time frame, (2) at a similar place, (3) with children of
approximately the same age, (4) who shared a home, (5) using the
same type of sexual contact and (6) with familiarly related chil-
dren.96 In Pignolet, the complaining witness and the third-party
witness were stepsisters, were approximately the same age97 and
lived together in the same family home.98 Each witness alleged
that during the same time frame,99 the defendant sexually as-
saulted them in the family home, late at night, while their mother
was working and when their other siblings were sleeping. 100 In
addition, each witness claimed that the defendant threatened
physical harm if she did not comply with the defendant's sexual
demands. 10' The trial court admitted the prior bad-acts testimony
under the lewd-disposition exception. 10 2 The supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's holding, reasoning that since the prosecu-
tion satisfied the six-prong test, the trial court appropriately
admitted the third-party prior bad-acts evidence for the purpose of
93. Id. at 182.
94. See id. (citing Colangelo, 179 A. at 149).
95. Colangelo, 179 A. at 149.
96. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181.
97. Id. at 178-79 (noting that the complaining witness alleged that the defend-
ant began molesting her when she was fourteen-years old and her stepsister al-
leged that the defendant began molesting her when she was nine-years old).
98. Id. at 180-82.
99. See id. at 176-79 (noting that the complaining witness claimed that the
defendant began abusing her in 1979 and that her stepsister claimed that the de-
fendant began abusing her in 1976).
100. See id. at 181.
101. See id. at 180-82.
102. See id. at 178 (noting that the trial judge admitted the prior bad-acts evi-
dence "because it tended to show a lewd or wanton predisposition... on the part of
the defendant toward his two stepdaughters").
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demonstrating the defendant's lewd disposition towards his
stepdaughters.103
Justice Kelleher, author of the Jalette opinion, adamantly dis-
sented from the majority opinion in Pignolet. He stated that his
"basic disagreement with the majority stems from [his] belief that
the rationale that led to Jalette has been laid to its eternal rest
without benefit of so much as a eulogy." 104 Specifically, Justice
Kelleher reasoned that the court's erroneous use of the "interwo-
ven" language effectively discarded the Jalette mandate that the
prosecution must specify a precise, traditional 404(b) exception in
order to admit evidence of prior bad acts allegedly committed by
the defendant against third parties. 10 5 Therefore, Justice Kelleher
concluded that, because the prosecution did not specify a precise
traditional 404(b) exception to which the prior bad-act evidence
was relevant, the evidence was solely propensity evidence. 10 6 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court still attempts to follow the Pignolet
test. Although review of Justice Kelleher's dissenting opinion in
103. See id. at 182 (noting that the court admitted the prior bad-acts evidence
after reasoning that the evidence complied with the three restrictions articulated
in Jalette).
104. Id. at 184-85 (Bevilacqua, C.J. & Kelleher, J., dissenting) ("Jalette was
written for the express purpose of barring the indiscriminate use of evidence of
'other crimes' since such evidence presents a substantial risk to an accused's right
to a fair trial, especially when the other evidence suggests sexual misconduct.").
105. See id. at 184-86; see also Donner-Froelich, supra note 12, at 230-31 (rec-
ognizing that the holding in Pignolet discarded the Jalette court's requirement that
trial judges may only admit prior bad-acts evidence against third parties according
to the specified 404(b) exceptions).
106. See Donner-Froelich, supra note 12, at 231. The Pignolet court incorrectly
applied the Jalette test for determining the admissibility of uncharged bad-acts
evidence because, as Justice Kelleher and Chief Justice Bevilacqua noted in dis-
sent, "at no time did the trial justice give any consideration to the necessity for
presenting [the sisteri's testimony." Id. (quoting Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 185 (Bevilac-
qua, C.J., Kelleher, J., dissenting)). In addition, even if the court did take into
account the necessity of the prior bad-acts evidence, the court's standard of review
makes the Jalette precondition for admissibility worthless. The majority in
Pignolet held that the trial court inquired into the necessity of the prior bad-acts
evidence simply because (1) "[t]he prosecutor represented to the court that she be-
lieved the evidence of the sister was necessary to meet the state's burden of proof,"
and (2) the sister's testimony would have been admissible on rebuttal if the defend-
ant testified. Id. at 231 n.93 (quoting Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 182). If the only test to
determine whether prior uncharged bad-acts evidence is admissible is to ask the
prosecution if it thinks the testimony is necessary to meet the burden of proof re-
quired for a conviction, then the Jalette test is meaningless.
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Pignolet suggests an error in the court's reasoning, this Note does
not consider that quandary in depth.
After Pignolet, Rhode Island had a new, expansive lewd-dispo-
sition exception. 10 7 Courts could consider admitting prior un-
charged sexual-misconduct evidence if any one of three conditions
existed: (1) if the defendant purportedly committed the alleged,
uncharged "not too remote sex crime" against the complaining wit-
ness and a third party testified about the abuse;' 08 (2) if the de-
fendant purportedly committed the alleged, uncharged "not too
remote sex crime" against the complaining witness and the com-
plaining witness testified about the abuse'0 9 or (3) if the defendant
committed the alleged uncharged "not too remote sex crime"
against a third party and the third party testified about the
abuse.110 While the Rhode Island Supreme Court follows the mis-
guided Pignolet approach, this Note demonstrates that the court
misapplied the Pignolet standard in Hopkins and rendered an im-
proper result.
3. The Quattrocchi Test: Limiting Pignolet
In State v. Quattrocchi,111 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
again revisited the lewd-disposition exception. In Quattrocchi, the
defendant was tried and convicted for sexually assaulting his ex-
107. In 1992, Rhode Island's application of the lewd-disposition exception was
directly challenged in State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 530 (R.I. 1992). The defense
argued that the exception was overruled by the state's adoption of the 1987 Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence because Rule 404(b) makes no reference to the lewd-dis-
position exception. Id. at 531-32. The court held the exception existed outside the
confines of the evidentiary rule and was supported by a long line of multi-state
authority. See id. at 531 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence § 4:18, at 50 (1984); Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Wein-
stein's Federal Evidence § 404.22[1][c], at 404-79 (1989)).
108. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
109. State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1983) (holding that the court was
extending the lewd-disposition exception to cover testimony by the complaining
witness regarding uncharged bad acts committed by the defendant against oneself
since it is admissible to prove the defendant's lewd disposition towards the com-
plaining witness).
110. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181 (holding that "not too remote sex crimes" meant
closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the victims and the form
of sexual acts"); see also Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533 (holding that after establishing
the threshold requirement for potential admissibility, the court must subject the
proffered evidence to the three articulated restrictions to determine whether ad-
mitting the evidence will unfairly prejudice the defendant).
111. 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996).
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girlfriend's daughter for approximately ten years. 112 During the
trial, the trial judge permitted the prosecution to present testi-
mony regarding two alleged, uncharged sexual assaults by the de-
fendant against two girls. 113 Despite the fact that no family
relationship existed between the three alleged victims and none of
the three witnesses lived together, the trial court admitted the
prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition exception. 114
The trial court found the defendant guilty of two counts of first-
degree sexual assault. 115 Quattrocchi appealed his conviction,
claiming that the admission of the prior bad-acts testimony vio-
lated Rule 404(b) because the prosecution offered the evidence
solely to prove his propensity to commit sex crimes." 6 Quattrocchi
claimed that the trial court thereby committed a reversible error
by denying him a fair trial." 7 On appeal, the supreme court held
that due to the extreme prejudicial nature of the third-party prior
bad-acts evidence, the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence
was a reversible error." 8
The Quattrocchi court needed to re-examine the Pignolet doc-
trine in order to determine whether the trial court committed a
reversible error by admitting the prior bad-acts evidence. The
supreme court first re-affirmed the Pignolet holding by stating that
in certain circumstances, the court may admit evidence regarding
the defendant's non-remote prior bad acts allegedly committed
against someone other than the complaining witness. 119 Specifi-
cally, the court mandated that the admissibility of such prior bad-
acts evidence, according to Pignolet, is contingent on both the com-
plaining witness and the third-party witness living in the same
house at the time of the alleged assaults. 120 The court refused to
expand the lewd-disposition exception to encompass testimony
112. Id. at 880.
113. See id. at 884-85.
114. See id. at 885-86 (noting that one prior bad-acts witness was the defend-
ant's godchild and the other witness was the defendant's neighbor).
115. See id. at 879.
116. See id. at 885.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 887.
119. See id. at 885-86.
120. See id. (emphasizing that the Pignolet court properly admitted the third-
party prior bad-acts evidence "since both children lived in the same house with the
defendant and that all but one of the sexual acts took place during the same
interval").
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from third parties living outside the household of the complaining
witness since such evidence is likely to prejudice the defendant
unfairly. 121
The Quattrocchi court further held that the facts of Pignolet
were the extreme upon which it was willing to admit third-party
uncharged bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition exception
since prior bad-acts evidence can be overwhelmingly prejudicial to
the accused. 122 Specifically, the Quattrocchi court recognized that
juries often perceive prior bad-acts evidence as proof that the ac-
cused is a bad person who has a propensity toward sexual molesta-
tion and, therefore, must be guilty of the charged offense. 123
Acknowledging that prior sexual-misconduct evidence is extremely
prejudicial, the court also held that any expansion of the Pignolet
test "would ... have the effect of superseding Rule 404(b) in re-
spect to sexual assault charges." 124 Thus, in sexual-molestation
prosecutions, if the prosecution does not satisfy all six prongs of
the Pignolet test, then the third-party prior bad-acts evidence is
inadmissible. 125 It is reassuring to defense attorneys that the
court ended its expansion of Rule 404(b)'s lewd-disposition excep-
tion with its Quattrocchi decision.
B. The Admissibility of Character Evidence to Prove Plan
Jalette, in addition to limiting the application of the lewd-dis-
position exception, further held that trial judges may admit prior
bad-acts evidence if the evidence is necessary to establish one of
the traditional 404(b) exceptions. 12 6 Rhode Island Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) explicitly states that plan is one of the accepted other
purposes for admitting uncharged prior bad-acts evidence. 127 The
plan exception is a mechanism for admitting prior bad-acts evi-
121. See id. at 886; see also State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 317 (R.I. 1997) (not-
ing that the court refused to expand the lewd-disposition exception to allow testi-
mony from alleged victims who did not live with the complaining witness).
122. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. (noting that this definition is supported in other jurisdictions).
126. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
127. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual
Construction to Resolve the Dispute Over the Meaning of the Term "Plan" in Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 (1995) (noting that
Rule 404(b) explicitly mentions "plan" as a relevant reason for admitting prior bad-
acts evidence).
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dence so that the jury has a complete picture of what transpired
during the crime charged. 128 Moreover, courts can use the excep-
tion to admit evidence of the accused's prior bad acts as a means of
establishing that the defendant had an elaborate plan to perpe-
trate the crime charged.12 9
Like all Rule 404(b) exceptions, the plan exception was created
by the drafters of the evidentiary rules with the intent that courts
construe the exception narrowly so as to limit the prejudicial effect
resulting from the admission of propensity evidence.' 30 However,
in sexual-molestation prosecutions, despite the fact that the link
between the prior bad-acts evidence and the crime charged is
rather attenuated, courts often admit the prior bad-acts evidence
comparatively broadly under the plan exception. 13 Currently, two
contrasting interpretations of the plan exception exist: (1) the
true-plan theory and (2) the spurious-plan or pattern-of-criminal-
ity theory.132 The former limits the application of the plan excep-
tion, while the latter makes the plan exception all-encompassing.
1. True-Plan Theory
The true-plan theory is the traditional, narrow interpretation
of the plan exception.' 33 This interpretation permits courts to ad-
128. See Mar, supra note 21, at 848.
129. See id.
130. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee's note (recognizing
that in general, evidence of prior bad acts is prejudicial and inadmissible); see also
State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316 (R.I. 1997) (recognizing that prior bad-acts evi-
dence tends to be "considered so prejudicial that it is per se inadmissible regard-
less of any relevancy it might have" to demonstrate the accused's propensity to
commit the alleged crime).
131. See Imwinkelried, supra, note 127, at 1008 (noting that the prosecution
usually cites to the common-plan exception when attempting to persuade a court to
admit uncharged prior sexual-misconduct evidence, since appellate reversals for
improper application of the common-plan exception are minimal); see also 2 David
W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 140, at 258-62 (1985)
(noting that the plan exception is often broadly construed in prosecutions of sex
crimes).
132. Fingar, supra note 60, at 517; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, supra note
107, § 3:12 (noting that courts tend to apply the Rule 404(b) exception of plan with
varying degrees of difficulty).
133. "[Tihe [true-plan] theory protects the accused from purely opportunistic
actions, which [are] inadmissible as plan evidence." Mar, supra note 21, at 858
n.86. The spurious-plan theory completely "fails to recognize the issue of purely
opportunistic behavior." Id. (defining opportunistic behavior as "any spontaneous
action committed by the accused when a window of opportunity suddenly becomes
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mit prior bad-acts evidence in one of two ways. First, courts may
admit prior bad-acts evidence if the prosecution can prove that the
defendant's charged and uncharged bad acts are part of one grand
plan.' 34 Based on this definition, courts may appropriately admit
prior bad-acts evidence if each bad act is a stage or a step in the
defendant's "all-encompassing scheme" to commit the charged
crime. 135 Second, courts may admit prior bad-acts evidence under
the true-plan theory if the prosecution successfully demonstrates
that the defendant meticulously orchestrated the manner in which
he committed each of his bad acts. 136 A crime is meticulously
available") "Conduct is 'purely opportune' only if it is spur of the moment conduct,
intended to take advantage of a sudden opportunity." Id. (citing United States v.
Ivery, 999 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.5 (6th Cir. 1993)). "Such conduct, if purely spur of the
moment, cannot be deemed part of a plan. Even under the unlinked acts theory of
Ewoldt, a 'plan does not encompass unrelated crimes committed against random
targets of opportunity.'" Id. (quoting Mendez & Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at
491-92).
134. People v. Tassel 679 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1994) (reasoning that there must be a
"'single conception of plot' of which the charged and uncharged crimes are individ-
ual manifestations," and that "[aibsent such a 'grand design,' talk of a 'common
plan or scheme' is really nothing but the bestowing of a respectable label on a
disreputable basis for admissibility-the defendant's disposition"); 1A John Henry
Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 217, at 1883 (1983); see also Bryden & Park,
supra note 58, at 546 (noting that the plan exception can apply to instances where
the prior bad-act is "a means by which the defendant prepares for the commission
of another crime, as in Wigmore's example of stealing a key in order to rob a safe");
Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1014 (recognizing that the true-plan theory per-
mits the admission of prior bad-acts evidence when the charged and uncharged
bad acts form one greater goal); Mar, supra note 21, at 850 (noting that prior bad-
acts evidence may be admitted under the plan theory if the charged and uncharged
bad acts are part of an "overall design or grand scheme").
135. See id.; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1014 (noting Tassel, 679
P.2d at 5 n.4 (recognizing that the plan exception permits the admission of prior
bad-acts evidence when the prior bad act and the charged crime are part of some
"grand design")); 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth Graham, Jr., Federal Practice
and Procedure: Evidence § 5244, at 500 (1978) (noting that trial judges may admit
prior bad-acts evidence when the defendant allegedly committed the charged and
uncharged bad acts in order to achieve one greater objective).
136. See State v. Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195, 197-201 (R.I. 1997). In Nardolillo,
the defendant was charged with robbing nineteen houses within two and one half
months. The defendant was acquitted on thirteen charges since the victims re-
fused to testify. During each robbery, the defendant's girlfriend drove him around
the neighborhood looking for vacant homes. The defendant repeatedly stole elec-
tronic equipment which he immediately exchanged with his supplier for drugs.
The court allowed the prosecution to inform the jury about the thirteen other
charges according to the plan exception. The court reasoned that the trial judge
properly admitted the evidence about the thirteen acquittals since the defendant
repeatedly used the same planned technique and since each house robbery enabled
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orchestrated if the defendant used the exact same technique to
commit each crime, such as always wearing a Mickey Mouse mask
when robbing banks. Consequently, if the prosecution can show
that the defendant consciously chose to employ the same technique
and methodology to commit each bad act, then the prior bad-acts
evidence is admissible. 137
2. Spurious-Plan Theory
The spurious-plan theory, 3 8 by contrast, is the broad compre-
hensive interpretation of the plan exception. According to this the-
ory, the prior bad acts and the alleged crime need not be related.13 9
Rather, the minimum requisite for admitting prior bad-acts evi-
dence under the spurious-plan theory is that the alleged bad acts
are similar to the charged crime. 140 For example, under the spuri-
ous-plan theory in a prosecution for selling drugs, the trial judge
may admit evidence of the defendant's past convictions for selling
drugs in order to prove the defendant's plan to sell drugs. During
prosecutions for drug-related misconduct,' 4 ' burglary142 and sex
him to achieve his greater goal of supporting his daily cocaine habit of $250. See
id.; State v. Sepe, 410 A.2d 127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (holding that evidence is admissi-
ble under the "common-plan" exception when "two or more crimes [are] so related
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other"); see also Imwinkelried,
supra note 127, at 1013 (noting that for the true-plan theory to permit the admis-
sion of prior bad-acts evidence, "there must be 'such concurrence of common fea-
tures that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general
plan of which they are the individual manifestations'"); Mar, supra note 21, at 850
(acknowledging that trial judges may use the plan exception to admit prior bad-
acts evidence when there is evidence that the defendant "used the same technique
and that he employed the same methodology by a conscious choice").
137. See Mar, supra note 21, at 850.
138. This use of the plan theory is also referred to as "unlinked plan." See Bry-
den & Park, supra note 21, at 178; Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1011.
139. See Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1009.
140. See id. at 1012.
141. See generally Wright & Graham, Jr., supra note 135, § 5244, at 500 n.9
(mentioning drug-related misconduct in discussion of the plan exception).
142. See, e.g., People v. Moen, 526 P.2d 654, 655-56 (Colo. 1974) (noting that
the prior burglary of an apartment committed by the defendant was similar to the
charged burglary so that the trial judge properly admitted the prior bad-acts evi-
dence under the plan exception); Perry v. People, 181 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Colo. 1947)
(holding that the trial judge properly admitted evidence that the defendant previ-
ously committed a burglary in the present trial for burglary under the plan
exception).
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offenses, 143 the State often argues the spurious-plan theory as a
means of convincing trial judges to admit prior bad-acts evidence.
Prosecutors advocate the use of the spurious-plan theory because it
enables courts to admit prior bad-acts evidence to illustrate that on
separate occasions, the defendant used somewhat similar methods
to perpetrate a number of parallel but unrelated bad acts.'4 Spe-
cifically, a court, when admitting evidence under the spurious-plan
theory, simply requires the prosecution to show that the accused
previously committed a bad act similar to the crime charged. 145
Therefore, if a defendant repeatedly commits the same type of
crime, then this expansive interpretation of plan essentially en-
ables courts always to permit prior bad-acts evidence. 146
In contrast to the spurious-plan theory, advocates for the true-
plan theory argue that the spurious-plan theory is nothing more
than a guise under which courts may admit unadulterated propen-
sity evidence. 147 Furthermore, true-plan advocates argue that,
since many courts continue to expand the plan exception irrespon-
sibly, the exception is degenerating into a "dumping ground" for
inadmissible bad character evidence.' 48 In essence, the argument
follows, courts adopting the spurious-plan theory are converting
the plan exception into a "plan-to-commit-a-series-of-similar-
143. See Robert N. Block, Comment, Defining Standards for Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 261, 278-80
(1977). See, e.g., People v. Partin, 509 N.E.2d 662, 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) appeal
denied, 515 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1987) (holding that the trial judge properly admitted
evidence of prior sexual misconduct during the defendant's trial for pornography
and sexual molestation).
144. See Bryden & Park, supra note 21, at 178; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Schoening, 396 N.E.2d 1004 (Mass. 1979) (holding that evidence of the defendant's
receiving kickbacks on two previous occasions was admissible to show plan or mo-
tive even though the kickbacks were all from different parties). "[Tihe defendant's
use of his position to guarantee contracts to particular firms and thus to guarantee
kickbacks to himself provided the common or general scheme underlying all three
transactions." Id.
145. See Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1011-12 (citing United States v.
Wright, 943 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also State v. Hines, 354 N.W.2d 91,
93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the court properly admitted evidence of
prior burglaries committed by the defendant during the defendant's present trial
for burglary).
146. See Fingar, supra note 60, at 517.
147. Id. at 517-18 (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 107, at §§ 3:21 to :23).
148. Mendez & Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 478-79 (citing Wright & Gra-
ham, Jr., supra note 135, § 5244, at 499).
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crimes theory."14 9 The Rhode Island Supreme Court inappropri-
ately applied the spurious-plan theory in Hopkins. This Note ar-
gues that, even under the proper true-plan theory, the prior
sexual-misconduct evidence offered against the defendant was
inadmissible propensity evidence.
3. Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415
Congress's recent adoption of three new federal evidentiary
rules sheds light on the debate between the true-plan theory and
the spurious-plan theory. 150 Until recently, in theory, the Federal
Rules of Evidence maintained the ban on irrelevant character evi-
dence. However, on September 13, 1994, in response to public out-
rage towards sexual assault 151 and child molestation,' 5 2 Congress
enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413,153 414154 and 415155 as
149. Imwinkelried, supra note 107, at § 3:23.
150. Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414, 415.
151. There was enormous public outcry against the exclusion of prior miscon-
duct evidence after William Kennedy Smith was acquitted of raping a woman he
met in a Palm Beach, Florida bar. See Danna, supra note 59, at 278. Smith admit-
ted to having sex with the women but he claimed it was consensual. See Bryden &
Park, supra note 21, at 171. The trial judge excluded the testimony of three other
women who alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted them, and as a result,
Smith was acquitted. See id. at 171-72.
152. See supra note 1 (detailing public disdain for child molestation).
153. Fed. R. Evid. 413. The full text of the rule follows:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule,
the attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant,
including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testi-
mony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled
date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evi-
dence under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" means a
crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title
18, United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an
object and the genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant
and any part of another person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily
injury, or physical pain on another person; or
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part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.156 These three rules permit trial judges to admit all prior
sexual-misconduct evidence during the prosecution of a sex
crime. 157 Proponents of the bill asserted that Congress needed to
enact new evidentiary rules for the purpose of broadening and clar-
ifying the Rule 404(b) plan exception.' 58 These new rules provide
a specific exception to the character-evidence ban, and thus enable
prosecutors to present prior uncharged bad-acts evidence in sexual
assault and child-molestation prosecutions. 159
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs(1)-(4).
Id.
154. Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is more or less identical to Rule 413 with the
following differences: (1) in paragraph (a) the words "child molestation" are substi-
tuted for "sexual assault;" (2) paragraph (d) defines a "child" as "a person below the
age of fourteen;" (3) paragraphs (d)(1)-(4) substitute the words "child" for "another
person" and remove references to consent. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 414 with Fed. R.
Evid. 413.
155. Federal Rule of Evidence 415 provides in part:
Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or
Child Molestation.
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predi-
cated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an of-
fense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule
413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
Fed. R. Evid. 415.
156. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-
14223 (1994)). These rules were not created by the traditional rule-making pro-
cess. Specifically, there was no advisory committee proposal, public comment pe-
riod or Supreme Court adoption. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
157. See Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414, 415.
158. Danna, supra note 59, at 290-91 (citing Anne Elsberry Kyl, Note, The Pro-
priety of Propensity: The Effects and Operation of New Federal Rules of Evidence
413 and 414, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 659, 661, 675 n.16 (1995)) ("According to [Senator
Kyl], the goal was to create a broader or clearer statement [of] the 'design or plan'
exception in Rule 404(b), which the Congress believed was only seldom and nar-
rowly applied."); see also 140 Cong. Rec. H2415-04, at H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19,
1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
159. See Danna, supra note 59, at 291. Proponents for the new rules argued
that they were necessary in order to secure more convictions of sexual offenders.
Jason L. Mccandless, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental Un-
fairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 5 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 689
(1997). Vocal advocate and Congresswoman Susan Molinari (R-N.Y.) argued that
the rules were necessary to prevent serial rapists and child molesters from going
free. 140 Cong. Rec. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
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Congress's recent decision to adopt these three new expansive
rules of evidence 160 illustrates its intention to have courts construe
Rule 404(b)'s other-purposes exceptions narrowly. If Congress in-
tended courts to interpret Rule 404(b)'s exceptions broadly, then
the three all-encompassing amendments would be superfluous.
Therefore, it is likely that the true-plan theory, which calls for a
narrow interpretation of the plan exception, is the intended device
for interpreting the plan exception. Although Congress, by Rules
413, 414 and 415, rendered the "plan" limit inoperative with re-
spect to sexual assault and child-molestation prosecutions, the en-
actment of these three new rules of evidence suggest that Congress
originally intended for trial judges to construe the other-purposes
exceptions within Rule 404(b) narrowly.
III. STATE v. HOPKINS
A. Factual and Procedural History
In State v. Hopkins,161 the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
evaluated the question of the admissibility of prior sexual-miscon-
duct evidence in a child-molestation prosecution. The trial court
found the defendant, Charles Hopkins, guilty of five of seven
counts of sexual molestation against his stepson, Mark. 162 Hop-
kins is currently serving thirty years on counts one, three and six,
and twenty years for counts two and four.163 The court suspended
twenty-five years of his total sentence. 64
Mark, seventeen at the time of trial, 65 alleged that his stepfa-
ther molested him between the ages of nine and thirteen while
they were living in the same house.' 66 Mark claimed that when he
was about nine-years old, his stepfather made him touch his step-
father's penis.' 67 The sexual touching then progressed to oral
sex. 1 68 Mark further testified that his stepfather attempted unsuc-
160. See Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414, 415.
161. 698 A.2d at 183.
162. See Brief for Appellee at 1, State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1997) (No.
96-212-C.A.).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 2.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2.
168. See id.
363
364 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:333
cessfully to force him to have anal sex.169 All of these alleged as-
saults occurred at the defendant's home over the course of
approximately four years.170
B. The Prosecution's Evidence of Prior Uncharged Bad Acts
Over the objection of the defendant, the trial judge permitted
the State to introduce uncharged prior bad-acts testimony from
two witnesses, each of whom alleged that the defendant assaulted
him many years earlier. 171 The court permitted James Snoke to
testify that the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted him approx-
imately seventeen years earlier while he worked at the defendant's
gas station.' 72 Moreover, the jury heard Charles Hopkins, Jr. tes-
tify that the defendant abused him approximately fifteen years
prior to the trial.17 3
1. Testimony of James Snoke
At trial, James Snoke claimed that while he was working at
the defendant's gas station, the defendant sexually assaulted him
approximately four times. 174 These assaults allegedly occurred in
1977 when Snoke was thirteen.175 Snoke testified that the defend-
ant molested him on multiple occasions at the gas station, at the
defendant's home and on a camping trip.176 He claimed that the
defendant threatened to accuse him of stealing from the gas sta-
169. See id. at 3.
170. See id.
171. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 186.
172. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
173. See id. at 17. The defendant's biological son was twenty-five years old at
the time of trial. He testified that, although he could not remember the first time
he was molested, he thought the abuse began when he was seven or eight. See id.
at 5.
174. See id. At trial, Snoke, a recovering heroine and cocaine addict, admitted
to "seven prior criminal convictions ... which included larceny, violation of the
banking laws, forgery, breaking and entering with intent [to] commit larceny, pos-
session of cocaine, possession of a pistol without a license, discharging a pistol in a
compact area, and harboring a fugitive." See id. at 6.
175. See id. at 5. Because Snoke waited fifteen years to report the alleged
abuse, the statute of limitations expired, thus making it impossible for the state to
add the witness's claim to the charges against the defendant. See id. at 6.
176. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
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tion if he told anyone about the abuse. 177 The alleged encounters
involved sexual touching and oral sex.178
2. Testimony of Charles Hopkins, Jr.
Charles Hopkins, Jr., the defendant's twenty-six-year old bio-
logical son, was the second State witness regarding the defendant's
prior uncharged sexual misconduct. Charles Hopkins, Jr. is nine
years older than his stepbrother Mark.179 At trial, Hopkins, Jr.
testified that his father began molesting him while his parents
were still married and sharing a home. 180 Hopkins, Jr. thought
that the abuse began when he was approximately seven- or eight-
years old and stopped when he was about twelve-years old.' 8 '
Hopkins, Jr. also alleged that he thought the abuse involved anal
sex, oral sex and touching.'8 2 He was unable to remember specifi-
cally when or where the alleged incidents occurred. '3
C. Majority Opinion
On appeal to the supreme court, Hopkins argued that, despite
the trial judge's attempt to rectify the unfair prejudice of the prior
uncharged bad-acts evidence through limiting jury instructions, i s4
the evidence was so prejudicial that no curative instruction could
have alleviated or even palliated its effect.' 8 5 Therefore, Hopkins
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
180. See Brief for Appellee at 18, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
181. See Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
182. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
183. See Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.). Charles Hop-
kins Jr. could not clearly remember where the alleged abuse took place. He testi-
fied that the abuse occurred "probably in the home" and "probably in the parlor."
In addition, he could not remember how often he was allegedly abused by his fa-
ther. He testified that it probably occurred more than once a month and "maybe,
sometimes" more than once per week. See id.
184. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 187.
185. See State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 887 (R.I. 1996). At trial, before
Snoke and Hopkins, Jr. testified, the trial judge gave the following jury
instructions:
What [the witness] may say may refer to certain activity that took place
allegedly between Mr. Hopkins and [the witness]. This evidence may be
used by you for your consideration on the issue of motive, opportunity,
intent or plan, but you cannot use this evidence as proof that the defend-
ant is a bad person and therefore probably did commit the offenses that
the State alleges were committed against [Mark] Hopkins.
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petitioned the supreme court to reverse his conviction.' 8 6 In a
three-to-one decision,'5 7 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the trial court's decision to admit evidence of uncharged acts
of sexual misconduct did not constitute reversible error.'8 8 The
court held that the trial judge properly admitted the prior bad-acts
evidence to demonstrate both the defendant's lewd disposition to-
wards young boys and the defendant's plan to molest young boys
under his authority.'8 9
The Hopkins court addressed the issue of whether the prior
bad-acts evidence admitted served any purpose other than proving
the defendant's propensity to commit like crimes.' 90 Specifically,
the court held that, if the prosecution proffered the testimony of
Snoke and Hopkins, Jr. for any relevant other purpose besides es-
tablishing the defendant's bad character, then the trial judge cor-
rectly admitted the prior bad-acts evidence.' 9 '
First, the court held that the trial judge properly admitted the
uncharged prior bad-acts evidence under the other purpose of
plan.' 92 The majority reasoned that a common plan existed be-
cause all three incidents involved generally similar acts and vic-
tims of about the same age, and some of the prior uncharged acts
allegedly occurred in the home. 193 The court also held that these
generalizations established a modus operandi. 94 Second, the ma-
Brief for Appellant at 15 n.1, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
186. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 184-85.
187. Justice Flanders wrote the majority opinion and Justice Lederberg and
Justice Bourcier concurred. Chief Justice Weisberger dissented.
188. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 184-85.
189. See id. The court held that the trial court properly admitted the prior bad-
acts evidence:
[t]o show that Hopkins's sexual molestation of his stepson was part of a
common scheme or plan of sexual misconduct that Hopkins carried out
against boys of a similar age at a time when they too, like the stepson,
were under Hopkins's thumb .... ITihis 404(b) evidence was relevant to
show that when given the opportunity, Hopkins had a motive, an intent,
and a plan to abuse children of like age in a like manner to that in which
he abused his stepson when they were under his control or influence.
Id.
190. Id. at 184-87.
191. See id. at 185.
192. See id. at 185.
193. See id. at 185 n.2.
194. See id. at 186. But see State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I. 1993)
(noting that "[glenerally modus operandi is used to identify a defendant but may
also be used when the issue of consent is raised") (citing Youngblood v. Sullivan,
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jority reasoned that since a conviction hinged on the credibility of
the complaining witness, the prosecution "reasonably needed" the
prior bad-acts testimony to prove its case.195 Finally, the court
held that the trial court properly admitted the prior uncharged
misconduct evidence to prove that the defendant was driven by his
lewd disposition for young boys under his control and influence. 196
For these reasons, the court affirmed the admittance of the prior
bad-acts evidence.
D. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Weisberger concluded
that the evidence presented by Snoke and Hopkins, Jr. did not
qualify for any Rule 404(b) exception nor for any common-law ex-
ception. 197 Chief Justice Weisberger presented two arguments to
support his opinion that the majority expanded the other-purposes
exception beyond the confines the court had previously estab-
lished. 198 In order to come to these conclusions, he noted that the
court previously held that trial judges may admit prior bad-acts
evidence either (1) under the traditional exceptions of Rule 404(b)
or (2) in a limited number of instances to prove the defendant's
lewd disposition. 199 The dissent first argued that the majority er-
roneously affirmed the trial judge's decision to admit the prior un-
charged bad-acts evidence under the traditional Rule 404(b) other
purpose of plan.200 The dissent reasoned that the prior bad-acts
evidence could not fall under the plan exception because the past
crimes were too attenuated to demonstrate any grand scheme or
design.201 Specifically, these past acts occurred years apart and in
an entirely different context than the present crime. 20 2
Second, the dissent argued that the majority impermissibly af-
firmed the trial judge's decision to admit the prior bad-acts evi-
628 P.2d 400, 402 (Or. 1981)). In Hopkins, neither identity nor consent were is-
sues; therefore modus operandi was inappropriately applied. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at
185.
195. Id. at 187.
196. See id. at 186-87.
197. See id. at 190 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 189-90.
200. See id. at 190.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 191.
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dence under the lewd-disposition exception since the evidence does
not fall within the confines of the Jalette and Pignolet tests.20 3
Specifically, the dissent argued that the trial judge improperly ad-
mitted the prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition ex-
ception because neither witness lived in the same house as the
complaining witness, and neither alleged assault occurred during
the same time period.20 4 Therefore, according to the dissent, since
the prior bad-acts evidence did not qualify for the traditional Rule
404(b) plan exception nor the common-law lewd-disposition excep-
tion, the evidence is nothing more than impermissible propensity
evidence. 205 The next section of this Note details the majority's
errors in Hopkins and, through highlighting the dissent's argu-
ment, proposes a proper application of Rule 404(b).
IV. THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF
THE LEwD-DISPOSITION AND PLAN EXCEPTIONS IN
STATE V. HOPKINS
A. The Present State of the Lewd-Disposition Exception in
Rhode Island
After Quattrocchi, defense attorneys could sleep peacefully
since the Rhode Island Supreme Court appeared to be taking a
firm stance against any additional expansions of the lewd-disposi-
tion exception. However, after Hopkins, the restless nights re-
turned. In Hopkins, the Rhode Island Supreme Court misapplied
the lewd-disposition exception, thereby transforming the exception
into an ambiguous wildcard.
Prior to Hopkins, case law suggested that, when considering
the admission of prior bad-acts evidence in sexual-molestation
prosecutions, courts need first to consider whether the prior sexual
misconduct is "not too remote" from the crime charged.20 6 Previ-
ously, the court deemed prior sexual-misconduct evidence "not too
remote" if any one of the following three conditions existed: (1) the
203. See id. at 190.
204. See id.
205. See id. Chief Justice Weisberger further stated that the evidence was only
offered to show propensity, and thus, was inadmissible since "[the court has] stead-
fastly maintained that other acts of sexual molestation against third parties are
inadmissible for the sole purpose of showing propensity." Id.
206. See State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1983); State v. Pignolet, 465
A.2d 176, 181 (R.I. 1983); State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (R.I. 1978).
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defendant purportedly committed the alleged uncharged bad acts
against the complaining witness and a third party testified about
the abuse;20 7 (2) the defendant purportedly committed the alleged
uncharged bad acts against the complaining witness and the com-
plaining witness testified about the abuse208 or (3) the defendant
committed the alleged uncharged bad acts against a third party
and the third party testified about the abuse.20 9 Courts may only
apply this third option, viz. alleged uncharged bad acts against a
third party, if the defendant allegedly committed the prior bad acts
against victims who live in the same home as the complaining wit-
ness,210 and the bad acts evidence occurs during a similar time pe-
riod with a child of approximately the same age, who is related to
the complaining witness and who alleges similar sexual as-
saults.211 Thereafter, only if the prior bad-acts evidence survives
this threshold issue of remoteness, the court may then address the
second prong of whether the evidence is reasonably necessary to
prove the charges levied against the accused.212
1. The Admissibility of the Testimony of James Snokes
The Hopkins court ignored the first part of this two-prong test
devised by the supreme court to determine whether the prior bad-
acts evidence was admissible. Specifically, the court disregarded
the threshold question of whether the prior sexual misconduct evi-
dence was "not too remote" from the charged crime. Instead, the
court began its analysis with the second prong of the test by assert-
ing that the prior bad-acts evidence was reasonably necessary to
207. See supra note 204.
208. See Cardoza, 465 A.2d at 203 (holding that the lewd-disposition exception
extended to cover testimony by the complaining witness regarding uncharged bad
acts committed by the defendant against oneself since it is admissible to prove the
defendant's lewd disposition towards the complaining witness).
209. See Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181 (holding that a "not too remote sex crime"
meant "closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the victims and
the form of sexual acts"); see also Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533 (holding that after estab-
lishing the threshold requirement of potential admissibility, the court must subject
the proffered evidence to the three articulated restrictions to determine whether
admitting the evidence will unfairly prejudice the defendant).
210. See State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 886 (R.I. 1996); State v. Gomes,
690 A.2d 310, 317 (R.I. 1997).
211. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181.
212. Gomes, 690 A.2d at 316 (noting that cumulative evidence is inadmissible);
see also Jalette, 627 A.2d at 533 (recognizing that courts should admit prior bad-
acts evidence sparingly).
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show why the complaining witness belatedly reported the alleged
abuse and to rebut the defendant's claim that the complaining wit-
ness fabricated his allegations of sexual abuse.213 Had it actually
considered the remoteness threshold question, the supreme court
could not have reasonably affirmed the trial judge's decision to ad-
mit Snoke's prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposition ex-
ception.214 Specifically, Snoke's testimony fails at least four of the
six requisite elements necessary to establish that an alleged crime
is "not too remote." First, according to Quattrocchi, the witness
who is alleging the prior bad acts must have a familial relationship
with the complaining witness and live in the same home as the
complaining witness during the time of the alleged assaults.2 15
The Hopkins facts are even more demonstrative against admitting
the prior bad-acts evidence than the facts in Quattrocchi.216 In
Quattrocchi, one of the prior bad-acts evidence witnesses was the
godchild of the defendant. 217 However, in this case, no such famil-
ial relationship existed.218 Therefore, in Hopkins, Snoke's testi-
mony is inadmissible-it concerns a remote crime against an
alleged victim unrelated to the complaining witness who did not
live in the same house as the complaining witness.219 Addition-
ally, Snoke's testimony fails the remoteness test because he and
213. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185-87. The Hopkins court held that "the trial jus-
tice was entitled to conclude that the uncharged acts of sexual misconduct that
were offered via Snoke and Hopkins, Jr., were 'reasonably necessary' to prove the
prosecution's case, which largely turned on a credibility battle between Hopkins
and his stepson." Id. at 187.
214. See, e.g., Gomes, 690 A.2d at 317 (noting that prior bad acts are too remote
when the person alleging the prior bad act lives outside the home of the com-
plaining witness and the defendant).
215. See Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886; Gomes, 690 A.2d at 316. In Quattrocchi,
the court noted that Pignolet expanded the lewd-disposition exception insofar as
the bad acts evidence pertained to related witnesses living in the same home.
Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886. The court further held that:
Pignolet represented the extreme beyond which we are unwilling to ex-
tend the other-crimes... exception because of its overwhelming prejudice
to the defendant and its tendency to be viewed by the trier of fact as evi-
dence that the defendant is a bad man ... and, therefore, probably com-
mitted the offense with which he is charged.
Id.
216. See Brief for Appellant at 12, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
217. See Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 885.
218. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.) (noting that Snoke
worked at the defendant's gas station approximately ten years before the alleged
abuse against the defendant's stepson).
219. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 189.
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the complaining witness did not allege similar sexual assaults, and
the alleged assaults occurred approximately ten years apart.220
Therefore, Snoke's testimony fails the threshold remoteness issue
since he shares no familial relationship with the complaining wit-
ness, they do not live in the same home, they did not allege similar
acts and the alleged assaults are separated by an extensive length
of time. For these reasons, the trial judge inappropriately admit-
ted Snoke's testimony into evidence under the lewd-disposition
exception.
2. The Admissibility of the Testimony of Charles Hopkins, Jr.
The Hopkins court also improperly affirmed the trial judge's
decision to admit the testimony of Hopkins, Jr. under the lewd-
disposition exception. 221 Here again, the prior bad-acts evidence is
inadmissible because the evidence fails the threshold remoteness
prong. Pignolet and Quattrocchi established that third-party prior
bad-acts testimony is only admissible, and thereby "not too re-
mote," if six criterion are met.2 22 The witness and the complaining
witness must be: (1) related, (2) approximately the same age and
(3) living in the same household at the time of the assaults.223 In
addition, the prior bad acts must be closely related in: (1) time, (2)
nature and (3) place of assault. 224 In Hopkins, Hopkins, Jr.'s testi-
mony is inadmissible because it fails at least three of the six re-
quired elements of "not too remote" crimes. First, Hopkins, Jr. did
not live in the same home as the defendant and the complaining
witness during the time of the alleged assaults.225 Second, the al-
leged assaults did not occur during the same time period since they
220. See id. at 186.
221. See id. at 189-91 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting); see also State v. Gomes,
690 A.2d 310, 317 (R.I. 1997) (recognizing that the court refused to expand the
lewd-disposition exception to admit prior bad-acts testimony from alleged victims
who live outside the complaining witness's home); Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886
(noting that the court is not going to expand the lewd-disposition exception beyond
the confines of Pignolet).
222. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181; see also Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886 (holding
that courts cannot expand the lewd-disposition exception beyond the confines of
the holding in Pignolet).
223. See Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181.
224. See Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886; Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181.
225. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 189-90 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that the two half-brothers only lived together up to the complaining witness's third
birthday and no sexual assaults allegedly occurred during that time).
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were separated by approximately ten years.226 Additionally, the
defendant allegedly assaulted Hopkins, Jr. and the complaining
witness under entirely different circumstances. 227 Specifically,
Hopkins, Jr. alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted him
while his parents were still married, while Mark alleged that the
defendant assaulted him after the defendant divorced his mother
and moved out of the family home.228 Third, the prosecution could
not demonstrate any similarities regarding the style and/or tech-
nique of the sexual abuse due to Hopkins, Jr.'s deteriorated mem-
ory.22 9 Therefore, since the prosecution could not prove that
Hopkins, Jr.'s allegations regarded a "not too remote" crime be-
cause they did not live in the same house, the assaults did not oc-
cur during the same time period and there were no similarities in
the technique of the abuse, the trial court inappropriately admit-
ted the evidence.
Despite the holding in Quattrocchi, which recognized the need
to limit the scope of the Pignolet test, the Hopkins court proceeded
to expand the lewd-disposition exception. As a result of Hopkins,
living in the same home as the complaining witness is no longer a
pre-requisite for the admission of third-party prior bad-acts evi-
dence. After the expansive holding in Hopkins, the court is less
likely to overturn trial judges for admitting third-party prior bad-
acts evidence even though the alleged sexual assaults did not occur
within the same time frame and in the same manner.230 This new
expansive interpretation of the lewd-disposition exception essen-
tially nullifies the protections conferred by Rule 404(b). 231
B. The Application of the Plan Exception in Hopkins
1. The Misuse of the Spurious-Plan Theory
In addition to affirming the trial judge's admission of the prior
bad-acts evidence to show the defendant's lewd disposition towards
young boys,232 the Hopkins court held that the trial judge properly
admitted the evidence under the rubric of the traditional 404(b)
226. See id. at 186.
227. See Brief for Appellant at 19, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 19-20.
230. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 190 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 191.
232. See id. at 184-86.
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other purpose of plan. 23 3 Despite the court's holding, closer scru-
tiny of the allegations of uncharged misconduct offered by the pros-
ecution makes clear that the testimony cannot be admitted under
the plan exception. 234
In an attempt to shoehorn the prior bad-acts evidence into the
Rule 404(b) plan exception, the Hopkins court interpreted the plan
exception according to the spurious-plan theory rather than the
true-plan theory. Moreover, the court held that the trial judge
properly admitted the prior sexual-misconduct evidence under the
plan exception because the evidence demonstrated that the defend-
ant previously committed similar crimes, thus establishing the de-
fendant's plan to molest young boys.
23 5
According to the spurious-plan theory, prior bad-acts evidence
is admissible if the alleged bad acts are similar to the charged
crime.236 This reasoning supporting the spurious-plan theory is
inappropriate for several reasons. First, Congress's recent decision
to adopt three new, expansive rules of evidence 237 demonstrates its
intent that courts construe the Rule 404(b) other-purposes excep-
tions narrowly. If courts could interpret plan according to the
spurious-plan theory, then trial judges may already admit virtu-
ally all prior sexual-misconduct evidence under Rule 404(b). De-
spite the existence of Rule 404(b), Congress decided to enact
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415. These new rules en-
able trial judges to always admit evidence of the accused's commis-
sion of any other sexual assaults when the defendant is being tried
for an offense of sexual assault or child molestation. 238 Therefore,
had Congress recognized the spurious-plan theory as a legitimate
theory, its three new rules of evidence would be superfluous.239
These rules are not superfluous, as Congress's original intent was
for trial judges to construe the other-purposes exceptions narrowly,
pursuant to the true-plan theory.
Second, if courts apply the plan exception liberally, the excep-
tion becomes nothing more than a mechanism enabling juries to
233. Id. at 185.
234. See id. at 190-91.
235. See Bryden & Park, supra note 21, at 178.
236. Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1012.
237. Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414, 415.
238. See id.
239. See supra Part II.B.3.
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hear extremely prejudicial propensity evidence. 240 Such a broad
interpretation of the plan exception enables trial judges to admit
any evidence of the commission of similar crimes under the rubric
of a plan to always commit a certain type of crime. Such an inter-
pretation defeats Congress's reasons for enacting Rule 404(b) since
jurors will inevitably convict defendants for being a bad person and
not necessarily for committing the charged crime. The result of
this expansive interpretation of Rule 404(b) is that the exceptions
will swallow the rule. For these reasons, the Hopkins court incor-
rectly applied the spurious-plan exception, thereby admitting inad-
missible evidence.
B. The Application of the True-Plan Theory
Even if the Hopkins court had applied the true-plan theory in-
stead of the spurious-plan theory, then admission of the prior bad-
acts evidence still would have been impermissible. According to
the true-plan theory, prior bad-acts evidence is admissible if the
prosecution can prove that the defendant's charged and uncharged
bad acts are part of some "illustrious scheme"24 1 or if the prosecu-
tion can demonstrate that the defendant meticulously planned out
the manner in which he committed each of his bad acts. 24 2
First, in Hopkins, the prior uncharged bad acts are inadmissi-
ble under the true-plan theory since the defendant did not commit
the charged and uncharged bad acts in order to realize any grand
scheme. 243 The prosecution argued that the defendant had a
grand scheme to molest young boys under his control. However,
this argument is unpersuasive. 244 Common sense dictates it un-
likely that the defendant consciously planned to molest Snoke,
Hopkins, Jr. and the complaining witness in order to achieve his
greater goal of molesting all young boys under his control. 245 This
type of analysis seems particularly illogical considering the fact
that the defendant supposedly waited over ten years between as-
saults.246 Additionally, neither of the alleged assaults occurred at
240. See id.
241. See supra note 134.
242. See supra note 136.
243. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 190-91 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
244. See id.
245. But see id. at 185. See id. at 190-91 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 186; see also State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 203-04 (R.I. 1983)
(holding that the defendant's alleged sexual assault against the complaining wit-
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the same locations, and the defendant did not use the same tech-
nique during each alleged assault.247 Therefore, it can hardly be
contended that the defendant created some all-encompassing
grand plan to sexually assault the complaining witnesses, Snoke
and Hopkins, Jr.,248 since the only similarity between the three
alleged assaults is the fact that they are all sex crimes. The prac-
tice of admitting prior bad-acts evidence under the plan exception
simply because all of the alleged bad acts are of the same criminal
nature, undercuts the intent of the plan exception and eviscerates
the protections of Rule 404(b).249
Second, the court improperly admitted the prior bad-acts evi-
dence under the plan exception because the prosecution did not
prove that the defendant consciously chose to employ the same
technique and methodology to commit each bad act.250 The only
clear similarity between the three alleged crimes is that they are
all sex crimes.251 Specifically, the defendant allegedly molested
both men at times and places extremely remote from the events
involving the complaining witness. 252 Snoke alleged that his
abuse occurred during a camping trip, at the defendant's gas sta-
tion and at the defendant's home. 253 Hopkins, Jr. could not even
testify to details of the sexual assaults because of memory fail-
ure.254 By contrast, the complaining witness alleged that the
abuse occurred at the defendant's home briefly before the arrest
which gave rise to the case.255 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
erred by admitting the prior bad-acts evidence under the plan ex-
ception since the prosecution failed to show that the defendant
used some common method or technique when committing these
alleged acts of molestation.
ness's grandmother could not be admitted to show the defendant's plan since the
two crimes were not related).
247. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 186.
248. See id.
249. See Mar, supra note 21, at 857.
250. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 190-91 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
251. See id.
252. See id. at 190. John Snoke and Charles Hopkins Jr. each claimed they
were molested by the defendant some ten years prior to the alleged assaults
against the victim and some fourteen to eighteen years before the trial. See id. at
186.
253. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
254. See id. at 21.
255. See id. at 2-3.
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Third, the trial judge inappropriately admitted the defend-
ant's prior bad acts under the plan exception because no similari-
ties existed in the methods of alleged abuse or in the results
supposedly achieved by the defendant. 25 6 For example, all three
assaults allegedly began when the victims were of various ages,
and each alleged assault endured for different lengths of time.257
Snoke alleged that when he was thirteen, the defendant molested
him on three different occasions all occurring within one year.258
Unlike Snoke, Hopkins, Jr. alleged that he thought that the de-
fendant began molesting him when he was seven- or eight-years
old and continued until he was approximately twelve-years old.259
Contrarily, the complaining witness alleged that the defendant
abused him from the time he was nine-years old until he was thir-
teen-years old.260 Furthermore, each alleged assault involved dif-
ferent types of sexual abuse. For example, Hopkins, Jr. alleged
that the sexual abuse consisted of anal sex, oral sex and touch-
ing.261 Snoke claimed that the defendant performed oral sex on
him,262 and the complaining witness alleged instead that he per-
formed oral sex on the defendant. 263
Fourth, the defendant did not use any signature technique or
methodology easily discernible to the court that suggests the three
alleged assaults were linked in any manner. 264 Since the defend-
256. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 189. The State asserted, and the court affirmed,
that the testimony of Snoke was necessary to demonstrate to the jury why the
victim finally brought charges against his stepfather. See id. at 185. This need is
an "insufficient basis to permit this extremely prejudicial testimony" because
"many victims of child molestation do not report the molestation immediately."
Brief for Appellant at 12, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.). See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Hynes, 664 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (noting that since evidence of prior
uncharged misconduct is inherently prejudicial as a general rule, it is not admissi-
ble to explain why the victim waited to report the alleged abuse); State v. Mayfield,
733 P.2d 438 (Or. 1987) (holding that the prosecution could not introduce the vic-
tim's three-year old sister's testimony to demonstrate why the victim finally re-
ported the crime reasoning that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the
probative value of such evidence).
257. See Brief for Appellant at 14, Hopkins (No. 96-212-C.A.).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 5-6.
260. See id. at 2 (the complaining witness alleged that he was being molested
approximately six to eight times per week).
261. See id. at 5.
262. See id. at 14.
263. See id.
264. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 190 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
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ant used different means for each alleged molestation, the defend-
ant did not employ any signature technique or methodology. 265
Therefore, the prior bad-acts evidence is not relevant to show the
defendant's plan since Snoke's and Hopkins, Jr.'s alleged assaults
were neither part of a plot to enable the commission of the present
crime266 nor the means to the end of achieving some grand objec-
tive.267 For these reasons, admission of the prior bad-acts evidence
denied the defendant the protections guaranteed by Rule 404(b).268
C. The Misapplication of Rhode Island Case Law
The Hopkins court relied on inapplicable case law to support
the trial judge's decision to admit the prior bad-acts evidence
under the Rule 404(b) plan exception. The majority cited three
Rhode Island cases in which the court affirmed the admission of
prior uncharged bad-acts evidence under traditional 404(b) other
purposes. 269 Hopkins is distinguishable from each of these cases.
1. The Misapplication of State v. Lamoureux
The court first cited State v. Lamoureux270 for the principle
that the prosecution may admit evidence of the defendant's prior
sexual assaults against someone other than the complaining wit-
ness to prove plan.2 7 1 In Lamoureux, the State charged the de-
fendant with first-degree sexual assault. 272 The court admitted
prior bad-acts testimony under the plan exception, holding that the
evidence established that the defendant used "substantially identi-
cal" methods of operation during each attack.273 In both instances,
265. See id.
266. See Wigmore, supra note 134, § 217, at 1883.
267. See State v. Sepe, 410 A.2d 127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (holding that the prosecu-
tion can only admit prior bad-acts evidence under the 404(b) plan exception if
there are "two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the others").
268. See State v. Wallace, 431 A.2d 613 (Me. 1981) (holding that evidence of
prior uncharged bad acts was extremely probative of defendant's guilt in the pres-
ent crime); Bryden & Park, supra note 58, at 546; Fingar, supra note 60, at 517;
Imwinkelried, supra note 127, at 1014.
269. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185 (citing State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13
(R.I. 1993); State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1983); State v. Pignolet, 465
A.2d 176, 180 (R.I. 1983)).
270. 623 A.2d 9 (R.I. 1993).
271. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185 (citing Lamoureux, 623 A.2d at 13).
272. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d at 10.
273. Id. at 13.
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the defendant approached the alleged victim at a bar and pro-
ceeded to gain the victim's confidence by engaging in neutral topics
of conversation.27 4 Then, in each case, the defendant asked the
victim for her phone number, requested a ride home and instigated
sexual advances that escalated into sexual demands. 275 Hopkins is
distinguishable from Lamoureux because, in Lamoureux, the pros-
ecution used the plan exception to show the defendant's modus
operandi, or motive of operation.276 Lamoureux notes that modus
operandi is only an applicable other purpose when either the pros-
ecution or the defense raises the issue of identity or consent.277 In
Lamoureux, the defendant claimed that the victim consented to the
sexual encounter.278 Since the defendant raised the issue of con-
sent in Lamoureux, it was appropriate for the court to receive the
evidence of other acts in order to prove the defendant's modus
operandi.27 9
By contrast, the Hopkins court never discussed the issues of
identity or consent, and the defendant never raised these de-
fenses. 280 Specifically, in Hopkins, there was no question whether
the stepfather was the person who sexually assaulted the victim.
Therefore, identity was not an issue.281 Additionally, since the de-
fendant denied having sexual relations with the complaining wit-
ness, the defense did not make consent an issue.28 2 Thus, because
identity or consent were not issues in Hopkins, the reasoning of the
Lamoureux court does not apply to Hopkins.
2. The Misapplication of State v. Cardoza
The majority also incorrectly relied on State v. Cardoza28 3 to
support its holding that the trial court appropriately applied the
plan exception in Hopkins.2 4 In Cardoza, the court admitted the
prior bad-acts evidence under the expanded lewd-disposition ex-
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 183.
281. Id. at 185.
282. See id. at 186.
283. 465 A.2d 200 (R.I. 1983).
284. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 184.
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ception and not the plan exception. Specifically, in Cardoza, the
court affirmed the admission of prior third-party bad-acts evidence
because the evidence came from a sibling who lived with the de-
fendant and the victim and who alleged abuse during the same
time period.28 5 By contrast, the prior third-party bad-acts evi-
dence offered in Hopkins does not fall under the lewd-disposition
theory because neither witness lived with the complaining witness
at the times of the alleged assaults, nor was either witness associ-
ated with the defendant around the time the defendant assaulted
the complaining witness.28 6
Cardoza, in fact, offers support for Hopkins' argument that the
court improperly applied the plan exception. Specifically, in Car-
doza, the court held that the trial judge committed a reversible er-
ror by permitting prior bad-acts testimony from the complaining
witness's grandmother.28 7 The court held that the trial judge im-
properly admitted the grandmother's testimony since the prior
bad-acts evidence only indicated that the defendant committed a
similar, yet independent, crime from the crime charged. 288 Simi-
larly, in Hopkins, the prior bad-acts evidence demonstrated alike
yet independent crimes because the crimes occurred outside the
complaining witness's home and over ten years prior to the crime
charged. 2 9 Thus, Cardoza, in fact, demonstrates that the Hopkins
court misapplied the plan exception.
3. The Misapplication of State v. Pignolet
Finally, the Hopkins court incorrectly relied on State U.
Pignolet to support its holding that the trial judge correctly admit-
ted the prior bad-acts evidence under the plan exception. Pignolet
represents an example of the application of the lewd-disposition
285. Cardoza, 465 A.2d at 203.
286. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 189.
287. Cardoza, 465 A.2d at 204 (holding that the grandmother's prior bad-acts
evidence was inappropriately admitted "to establish a behavior pattern of a man
who sexually abuses his stepchildren" and that the evidence is "cumulative and
unnecessary").
288. See id.; see also State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 531 (R.I. 1978) (noting that
prior bad-acts evidence is inadmissible if the evidence is cumulative); State v. Mas-
tracchio, 312 A.2d 190 (R.I. 1973) (holding that courts cannot admit prior miscon-
duct evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit bad acts).
289. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 186.
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exception and not the plan exception. 290 In Pignolet, the court af-
firmed the admission of prior bad-acts testimony from the com-
plaining witness's stepsister. The court explicitly permitted the
admission of the prior bad-acts evidence under the lewd-disposi-
tion exception only because both victims lived in the same home as
the defendant, and the alleged assaults occurred during the same
time period.291 Contrary to Pignolet, the Hopkins court cannot use
the lewd-disposition exception to admit the prior bad-acts evidence
since neither alleged victim lived with the complaining witness
and the defendant at the time of the charged crime, and ten years
separated the alleged attacks. 292 Therefore, Hopkins is distin-
guishable from Pignolet.
By misapplying the reasoning in Lamoureux, Cardoza and
Pignolet, the Hopkins court inappropriately expanded the plan ex-
ception beyond its conceived scope. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court originally adopted the 404(b) plan exception to limit the ad-
mission of prior bad-acts evidence to instances where the facts of
the case demonstrated that the uncharged and charged bad acts
were part of a common scheme. 293 Expanding the plan exception to
situations containing only "similarities" among the bad acts
defeats the purpose of the plan exception and its protections for the
defendant. 294
V. CONCLUSION
State v. Hopkins demonstrates the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's continuing practice of limiting the safeguards instilled
within Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) with regard to sexual-
molestation prosecutions. In effect, this unjustifiable trend is ham-
mering the final nail in the coffin of evidentiary Rule 404(b). In an
attempt to respond aggressively to a difficult case, the Hopkins
court (1) broadened the lewd-disposition exception to the point that
all prior uncharged bad-acts evidence is admissible in sex offense
prosecutions and (2) expanded the 404(b) other purposes to the
290. See Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181; see also State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 317
(R.I. 1997) (noting that Pignolet expanded the lewd-disposition exception).
291. See Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181.
292. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 186.
293. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
294. See Mar, supra note 21, at 860.
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point that the court can pigeonhole all prior misconduct evidence
into the plan exception.
As Chief Justice Weisberger warned, the court is causing "the
exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b) and Jalette and Pignolet to
swallow the rule [against character evidence] and render it a nul-
lity."295 To prevent the continuation of this practice, it is time for
the court to start applying the principles of evidentiary Rule 404(b)
more faithfully and thereby adopting a more limited approach with
respect to the admission of propensity evidence.
Heather E. Marsden
295. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 191 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).

